METRICS THAT MATTER: A PROTOTYPE 'COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY INDEX' FOR THE OSCE COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

As an intergovernmental organization created during the Cold War and intended to bridge the Soviet-led East and the U.S.-led West, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), through the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, rooted itself in the concept of "comprehensive security." There exists, however, a dearth of analysis on this avowed specialty of the OSCE. And, despite normative and institutional expansions, the OSCE has not set quantitative benchmarks to evaluate its 57 participating States' (pS) progress on comprehensive security. Using the critical approaches of "human security" and the Copenhagen School's "systemic" and "sectoral" security, this study has two key objectives: First, to construct and validate a prototype security and vulnerability assessment tool, the "Index of Comprehensive Security" (CSI), capable of rating and ranking OSCE pS. Using 2016 data, the study determined that the OSCE pS with the highest CSI score is Iceland (8.55), while the lowest scoring pS is Turkmenistan (4.42). The resulting CSI scores correlated strongly with the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI, R^2=0.85) and with per capita GDP (R^2=0.64). The second aim was to study the results produced by the CSI and elucidate security variances of the OSCE pS, with an emphasis on the 29 post-communist pS. Among other things, there was a strong correlation between the CSI scores and Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI, R^2=0.91). Data analysis also confirmed the significance of geopolitics, in that the location of a post-communist state (by way of distance east of Vienna) correlated moderately with the CSI scores (R^2=0.35). Overall, this Thesis demonstrated that the novel indicator of the CSI assists in understanding the nuances of security and insecurity among the OSCE pS and could potentially serve as a starting point for early warning systems and preventive actions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSI	Comprehensive Security Index
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
HDI	Human Development Index
IO	International organization
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODIHR	[OSCE] Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
pS	Participating State(s)
RRO	Rating and Ranking Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
U.S.	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII	Second World War

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

"When you can measure what you are
speaking about, and express it in numbers, you
know something about it; but when you cannot
measure it, when you cannot express it in
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and
unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of
knowledge, but you have scarcely in your
thoughts advanced to the state of science,
whatever the matter may be."
—Lord Kelvin, 1883[1]

While the maxim of Irish mathematical physicist Lord Kelvin hails from a positivist

era and is typically applied to underscore the importance of measuring physical

science, his laconic idea may partially hold true in other facets of society, including

contemporary global security and governance. In the twenty-first century, we face a

complicated combination of risks and global fluctuations, from natural and manmade

hazards and organized crime to disease, economic depression, war and terrorism,

which have altogether desperately necessitated a method for measuring not merely the

security of states alone, but more significantly, the security of human beings.

Governments, think tanks, institutes, and international organizations (IOs)

have increasingly turned to the provision of global benchmarks as a key tool to

highlight progress among countries in meeting critical governance standards that go

beyond purely economic indices to meet human needs. Through such measurements,

or "technologies of knowledge production and global governance,"[2] one may come to

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[1] Sir William Thompson (Lord Kelvin), "Electrical Units of Measurement" (lecture, Institution of Civil Engineers, London, May 3, 1883).
[2] D. Brent Edwards Jr. and Steven J. Klees, "Chapter 2: Knowledge Production and Technologies of Governance in Education," in *World Yearbook of Education 2014: Governing Knowledge:*

understand with more precision how humans fare in various societies. Benchmark metrics allow for the measuring of progress, ensuring improvement and better decision-making by states and their inhabitants. Such measures also lead to more public awareness and act as a means to keep states, as socialized actors, and IOs more transparent and accountable.

Comprising of 57 participating States (pS) from Europe, North America and Asia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the world's largest regional security organization, is an IO that, through its approach of "comprehensive security," has placed both humans and the state at the core of its work. The OSCE positions itself as a "forum for political dialogue on a wide range of security issues and a platform for joint action *to improve the lives of individuals and communities* [emphasis added]."[3] That said, however, there is a dearth of discussion and analysis on the OSCE's "comprehensive security" concept, and there are also no known or publicly accessible tools, whether indices or benchmarks, ever devised to evaluate the progress that pS have made in their respective levels of comprehensive security.

The OSCE traces its origins to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) of the early 1970s.[4] The CSCE (later OSCE, by 1995) started as a "conference process," the so-called "Helsinki Process," during the détente of the Cold War, which functioned as a notable multilateral diplomatic forum "for dialogue and negotiation" between the Soviet-led Eastern and United States-led Western blocs. The Conference was viewed as a critical step in rapprochement, especially after the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 between Richard Nixon and

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Comparison, Knowledge-Based Technologies and Expertise in the Regulation of Education, eds. Tara Fenwick, Eric Mangez, and Jenny Ozga (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 31-43.

[3] OSCE, "What is the OSCE?," Accessed September 15, 2017, https://bit.ly/2FP6Yke.

[4] OSCE, *OSCE Handbook* (Vienna: OSCE Press and Public Information Section, 2007), pp. 1-5.

Leonid Brezhnev, who represented the U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR), respectively. The preliminary consultations of the CSCE, unfortunately, did not garner much publicity, but from sparse news sources and articles, it is now understood that the advent of the eventual comprehensive security concept was a result of a "tit-for-tat" during the Conference.[5] According to Dunay:

> "The Russians wanted to have a big European security conference to reaffirm the territorial status quo and the political division of Europe. The West, in turn, wanted to have a human rights mechanism that partly would help with the political rights of the people in the East and a means to constantly challenge the so-called socialist countries."[6]

The outcomes of the "tit-for-tat" became imbued in the Conference's resulting "Helsinki Final Act," which was signed by the then 35 pS of the CSCE in 1975. Three delineated and interwoven security "baskets" (later "dimensions")—Politico-Military, Economic and Environment, and Human—eventually came to form the idiosyncratic and enduring trademark of the OSCE and its comprehensive approach to security. In contrast to traditional conceptualizations of security at the time, which were largely defined in military terms, the OSCE's comprehensive security concept shifted security further outside of the state, focusing on the external community-at-large, to combat salient globalized and transnational challenges.[7]

The three dimensions of the OSCE were defined to be complementary, interconnected, and interdependent, and remained the cornerstone of the organization's philosophy and praxis even when it was transformed from a conference process to an institutionalized IO. As such, the OSCE today is involved in a broad spectrum of security-related issues, from border security to natural resource

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[5] Sarah B. Synder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[6] Author email communication with Pál Dunay, George C. Marshall European Center of Security Studies, November 19, 2017.

[7] Monika Wohlfeld, "Reconceptualization of Security in the CSCE and OSCE," *Globalization and Environmental Challenges Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace* 3 (7) (2008): p. 643.

management to electoral observation.[8]

From the initial 1975 Helsinki Summit to the most recent OSCE Summit in 2010 in Astana, the OSCE has constantly apprised its comprehensive security approach by expanding its normative framework through the adoption of new commitments across the three dimensions. The organization itself expanded to encompass a unified budget of now €139 million, 17 field missions across Western Eurasia, 11 Asian and Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, and a range of institutions (in Vienna, Warsaw, Copenhagen, and The Hague). Yet, despite the OSCE's normative and institutional expansions, Karaaslan surmises that "the three dimensions have different records, visibility, and achievements. It seems … that the OSCE's comprehensive security approach in theory or rhetoric could not be put completely into practice by the Organization."[9] Ghebali, in turn, highlights that: "Whereas the human dimension appears as the most performing and high-profile, the economic dimension is less productive—with the Politico-Military dimension occupying a middle-of-the-road position."[10]

There is currently no method put in place by the OSCE to meter progress when it comes to comprehensive security. In fact, this is also recognized by the pS and the OSCE Secretariat itself. A background note on "Enhancing the Early Warning and Analytical Capacity of the OSCE," produced under the 2011 Lithuanian Chairmanship, stated, among other weaknesses, "the absence of systematic data collection across all [OSCE] dimensions and of a[n] [OSCE] comprehensive analysis

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[8] OSCE Secretariat, *The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major Milestones* (Vienna: OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Operations Service, 2009).

[9] Hakan Karaaslan, "The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the Post-Cold War Era: An Analysis of its Comprehensive Approach to Security" (Ph.D. dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2015), p. 110, http://bit.ly/2u2G5J9.

[10] Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life" (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Policy Paper No.10, 2005), p. 3.

framework (i.e., methodology)."[11] Even prior to the Lithuanian Chairmanship, at several OSCE Ministerial meetings from 1991 (Geneva) to 2004 (Sofia) and beyond, recommendations and invitations to pS have been made to increase monitoring, as well as the collection and maintenance of reliable data on a regular basis via national rapporteurs or independent monitoring mechanisms on a host of issues, including labour conditions, hate crimes, trafficking, displacement, terrorist-related websites, and financial flows.[12] Most pertinently, it was also reiterated to make this information publically available.

Yet, to this day, there does not seem to be any movement by the OSCE towards effectively monitoring how each OSCE pS fares across the comprehensive security dimensions. The reticence to evaluate and compare the 57 pS neither by the OSCE nor by independent think tanks and organizations on progress (or lack-there-of) on comprehensive security is a political question. According to Landman, "international government and [non-governmental organizations, NGOs] refuse to rank the countries for fear of recrimination and loss of credibility."[13] A key recommendation thus offered by Foroughi is for "empirically based, cutting-edge research" to be ideally produced by the OSCE, as well as the "rigorous reporting and monitoring of components of [the OSCE's] comprehensive security model." Foroughi further underscores the importance of generating such analyses with the "goal of far more open access reports and documents of interest to policymakers, scholars, and ordinary citizens." This would offer the opportunity to substantiate OSCE pS' declaratory commitments and serve to increase the Organization's credibility, while

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[11] OSCE, *Background Note on 'Enhancing the Early Warning and Analytical Capacity of the OSCE'*, CIO.GAL/65/11/Corr.1* (Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, 2011), http://bit.ly/2BfKhEK.

[12] OSCE, *OSCE Human Dimension Commitments* 1(3) (Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR, 2011), pp. 225-228.

[13] Landman claims that even the UNDP had come "under strong political criticism for its 1991 *Human Development Report*, which used a measure of human rights that ranked all UN member states .... For these reasons, NGOs such as Amnesty International refuse to rank the countries ..." (Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 244).

encouraging "research, analysis, and in-depth objective monitoring and political reporting" that is "focused on the promotion of the Helsinki Accords' liberal norms."[14] This is noteworthy, especially seeing as it was in the very origins of the OSCE that human rights abuses, for one of the first times ever, became subject to international diplomacy.[15] Moreover, the CSCE's agreed upon follow-up meetings allowed for the flourishing of the Helsinki Process. This ultimately gave rise to transnational networks, such as Czechoslovakia's "Charter 77" that monitored the pS' adherence to the Helsinki Accords and cemented human rights advocacy. In this respect, it is essential to return to the original spirit of the OSCE, and energetically monitor adherence to and progress towards comprehensive security.

Theoretical Framework

"Security" is a contested concept in the disciplines of international relations (IR) and economics, with no consensus regarding its meaning. In fact, different approaches define security with different meanings. The traditional understanding of security in the Cold War period, and even prior, was based on "national security" or "state security," and dealt with ways to safeguard the territorial and functional integrity of the state. This was largely done through establishing military doctrines and posturing. The conditions that enveloped the World Wars and the Cold War, in particular, also translated into pedagogy in IR which tended to be realist and positivist.

By the end of WWII, IR was essentially frozen in time. However, after the demolishing of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR, the global political landscape was altered and there was also a proliferation of both "new wars" and "humanitarian interventions." This led to an awakening of the need for a horizontally

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[14] Payam Foroughi, "The Helsinki Final Act Four Decades on," *Central Asian Survey* 36 (3) (2017): p. 296.
[15] Sarah B. Synder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

"widened" and vertically "deepened" intellectual understanding of security, which included new referent objects and new security issues for analysis. The post-positivist examination of security challenged the complacency of traditional international security orthodoxy, consequently leading to a plurality of critical approaches, one of which is the focus of this study: human security.

Human security is a humanist concept that, at the most basic level, emphasizes the human being as the main referent object of security. Two key elements of this concept include the *freedom from fear*, or the "protection of the physical integrity of human beings," and the *freedom from want*, or the "access to the good and services needed to satisfy material and non-material needs."[16] While human security officially became part of the policymaking agenda, especially that of the United Nations (UN) as of 1994, the concept has been situated in a long history of liberal democratic theory, and, today, has been promoted by liberal policymakers, IOs, and states.

The broad theoretical concepts that are connected to the normative human security policymaking agenda also relate to "systemic security" and the "sectoral approach" to security. Through their seminal work *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (of the "Copenhagen School" of IR) deepened the meaning of security. Years before, Buzan had already argued that there was a need for the adoption of "systemic security," which is an attempt to integrate three levels, individuals, states, and international systems, holistically.[17] The OSCE's "comprehensive security" concept seems to have been drawn from the Copenhagen School given its similarity to the concept of "systemic security," elaborated as a "concept of security [that] binds together the individual, states and the

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[16] Kofi Annan, *Millennium Report: We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st century* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000).

[17] Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Sussex: Wheat sheaf Books, 1983), pp. 247-248.

international system so closely that it demands to be treated in a holistic perspective."[18] The OSCE further adopts the Copenhagen School's "sectoral" approach, of which "systemic security" comprises; adapting Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde's five sector frameworks: military, environmental, economic, societal and political, to generate dimensions for the organization's comprehensive security approach, although having chosen to combine the military and political, as well as the environmental and economic sectors.

Overall, it is clear that the OSCE's comprehensive security concept is found at the crossroads of the human security policymaking agenda and the Copenhagen School's theoretical concept of systemic security and its sectoral approach to security. Given its overall focus on "improv[ing] the lives of people and communities" and its historical emphasis on the "human dimension," evident through the rise of a transnational network of Helsinki activists, it is apparent that the OSCE's ultimate ontological referent object of security is the human being as well as the communities in which humans are situated, thus embracing the human security policymaking agenda.[19] In tandem, the OSCE is rooted in a post-positivist broadening approach that both views the interactions of various levels of the international arena as one whole, as well as seeks to advance security in different domains that go beyond the traditional military aspects, which is highly relevant given the complex and globalized security circumstances the world faces today.

Research Questions

From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the OSCE is purported to work for stability, peace, and democracy for currently 57 states comprising over a billion people. But given the weight the OSCE has placed on the concept of comprehensive security since its initial

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[18] Ibid., p. 245.
[19] Synder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War …*, *op. cit.*

phase in the early 1970s, which today permeates all aspects of its core work as an IO, it is strange that the concept itself has not been heavily researched academically nor, more significantly, has there been any measurement of progress of pS towards achieving comprehensive security. These issues point to several questions and beg examination as an empirical study. Using the theoretical groundwork linked to the OSCE's "comprehensive security" concept, found flanked by the human security policymaking agenda and the Copenhagen School's "systemic security," this Thesis seeks to answer the following: *Can a methodology be developed to quantify and gauge the level of comprehensive security in and between the OSCE pS? More specifically, how can such a Comprehensive Security Index (CSI) be developed based on open source data and rudimentary mathematical formulae to rate and rank the OSCE pS?* In line with this general inquiry, the study also attempts to answer the following: *How will the OSCE's 29 post-communist States fare in the CSI rankings as compared to the rest of the pS? To what extent, if any, do the OSCE's 15 post-Soviet pS differ in their CSI scores compared to the remaining 14 post-communist pS? Where will the Central Asian countries fit on the CSI scale relative to other States in the OSCE?* And, finally: *What accounts for the differences in the CSI scores among the OSCE pS, in general, and the post-Soviet Central Asian states, in particular?*

Hypotheses

The following three hypotheses will be tested by this Thesis:

> **H₁:** A Comprehensive Security Index can be developed to discern the level of comprehensive security (or the risk of insecurity) in individual OSCE pS by way of utilizing a combination and synthesis of readily available open access data and indices corresponding to the OSCE's three dimensions. While the CSI resembles a new and unique index unidentical to the UN Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), given the wider components of security the CSI would cover, it will nevertheless correlate positively and

significantly with the HDI and also with data on per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of States.

H₂: From among the post-communist states, CSI scores will be highest among the Baltic states and the Visegrád/Central and Southeastern European states, followed by the Eastern European post-Soviet states of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova; Mongolia; Russia; then the Caucasus; and, finally, the Central Asian states.

H₃: Location or geopolitics plays a role on a country's comprehensive security. In general, though not in all circumstances, scores on the CSI will be lower the farther east of Vienna an OSCE pS is situated. As such, there exists a moderately significant and negative correlation with the CSI scores and capital city distances from Vienna.

Overall, this Thesis attempts to demonstrate that an architecture can be constructed for a CSI that can translate or operationalize the OSCE's central, yet relatively abstract, notion of "comprehensive security" by using concrete data attached to its three dimensions. The CSI can ultimately serve as an early warning tool and assist in the comprehension of patterns and trends of human insecurity across the OSCE area. Through rating and ranking, this study further aims to illustrate and explain the variances of the OSCE's post-communist pS on the scale. In so doing, the CSI may particularly help to explain how some "wealthy economies" in the post-communist space might be seen by some as "less secure," "less developed," or "politically closed" societies, through a lower CSI ranking. In these respects, it is hoped that the CSI, as a prototype global governance and accountability benchmark, will stimulate constructive debate among scholars and practitioners alike, and generate discussions by OSCE pS.

Methodology and Research Design

Global benchmarking can be understood as a method of *transnational governance* which comparatively assesses and classifies states, their people, and institutions

pertaining to their: (1) quality of *conduct* (2) quality of *design*, and (3) quality of *outcomes*.[20] As indicated by André Broome and Joel Quirk, the numerical translation processes of global benchmarking comprise simplification and extrapolation, commensuration, reification, and symbolic judgments.[21] To test its hypotheses, this Thesis develops a pioneering quantitative composite index prototype for the CSI using interpretations offered by Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, together with the numerical translation processes stipulated by Broome and Quirk above, as well as through guidance provided by a composite measure handbook issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[22]

The approach taken to formulate the CSI entails combining pre-existing, open source data offered by eight reputable indices, normally discussed in isolation, relate to the components of the OSCE trinity of the Politico-Military, Economic and Environmental, and Human dimensions. The selection of the indices is a complex process that evidently involves a number of trade-offs. The challenge is that an index has to be parsimonious and in-depth all at once, a potentially difficult task considering the multilevel and multidimensional nature of security. To overcome this issue, selection criteria for the component indices were developed as such: The indices had to be relevant to the OSCE's framework, publically available, have an established scientific methodology, be of good data quality, and possess spatial coverage. Hence, each of the three dimensions of comprehensive security, per the CSI, is composed of either two or four component indices, in turn made up of as many as a couple hundred sub-component variables or indicators. The component indices altogether measure a

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[20] André Broome and Joel Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance: The Practice of Global Benchmarking," *Review of International Studies* 41 (2015), p. 820.
[21] Ibid., p. 815.
[22] Jack Snyder and Alexander Cooley, *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit.*

range of structural factors, or "root causes," which can provide an indication of a pS' inclination or propensity for human and societal security or insecurity.

This study uses statistical normalization and aggregation techniques to calculate the CSI score for each OSCE pS as an arithmetic mean. The scores range from 1 to 10, with 10 signifying the highest CSI or absolute level of comprehensive security. It is important to note here that the statistical operations presented in the Thesis are, by and large, rudimentary and aimed at highlighting larger correlations, and do not enable casual inferences. The "Large-N" analysis that this Thesis carries out also cannot substitute for "Small-N" analyses, involving an in-depth study of a few or one pS. The overall CSI methodology was developed through an analytical process building on a theoretical grounding of an extensive literature review on human security, the OSCE's comprehensive security approach, a global data audit, expert input with regards to the selection of component indices, as well as research of other index methodologies.

Complementing the CSI is data analysis and interpretation. This also involved performing correlation analyses between the CSI and other indices, such as the HDI, the Gini Coefficient (a measure of income inequality), per capita GDP, Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI), as well as the geographic proximity (in km) of the capitals of post-communist States to Vienna. The results of the CSI and correlations are presented in bar graph, scatter graph, heat map, and spider diagram formats to allow for a visual comparison of comprehensive security among major components, pS, or within regions.

Research Significance

First, from a theoretical stance, this Thesis considers the importance of the concepts of "human security," "systemic security," and the "sectoral approach" in the broader

assessment of security in international affairs. **Second**, it offers the opportunity for the OSCE, a "security regime" and "global governance" actor, to create normative understandings of critical security issues, and to quantify its concept of comprehensive security. Additionally, it represents a prospect to gauge, through the operationalization of the three security dimensions, the headway (or otherwise) made by pS in achieving commitments applicable to the concept of comprehensive security through ranking, tracking, and highlighting the potential vulnerability of human livelihoods, while elucidating the impact of disparities across the OSCE. **Third**, the index benchmark further represents a valuable opportunity for both the OSCE and its pS to uphold the ideals enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, including democracy, human rights, non-violence, and collective security.

Fourth, this Thesis provides a basis and a means for the OSCE to increase its credibility, and embolden research and analysis focused on the normative advancement of the Helsinki Accords, as well as support improved benchmarks for the OSCE's programmatic work and other policy decisions and services, including forecasts and warnings. **Fifth**, enumerating 52 (out of the 57) pS, given data availability, the CSI provides an occasion for the permanent missions to the OSCE in Vienna, as well as their respective ministries of foreign affairs, to read the resulting report, and see how their country fared and where they rank per the three core baskets and on the CSI itself.

Limitations

There were at least five limitations for this study. The first being **time frame**. The research and gathering of data from relevant indices and the construction of the CSI were conducted over a two-month period, August to September 2017. This has also translated to signify a limited time frame for the CSI itself, only covering a year's

worth of data, rather than a larger time series, i.e. a longitudinal study, which would be more valuable to examine trends and changes over time. Second, **bias and simplification**: Assumptions were made and simplifications were applied to choose a quantitative representation of complex, multilevel and multidimensional human values. Third, **geographical scope**: Only 52 of the 57 OSCE pS were measured, given the lack of a complete set of data across the index components. The five pS excluded from the study are: the Principality of Andorra, the Holy See, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Principality of Monaco, and the Republic of San Marino.

Fourth, **structural focus**: The CSI excludes some likely existing component indices and indicators which may help to characterize a greater number of situations affecting "comprehensive security" and those relevant to the OSCE's work, such as the work done with the Roma and Sinti. Furthermore, dynamic real-time events, specifically those that could be "triggering events," are not factored in the CSI given the current iteration's focus on "root causes" or "structural issues." And, finally, **reliance on secondary data**: As the CSI is a conglomerate of existing data from rating and ranking organizations (RROs), results may be affected by the limitations of the RROs themselves, their particular methodologies, and their datasets.

Chapter Two

CONCEPTUALIZING COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

"… the ultimate concern of states is not for
power but for security." – Kenneth Waltz[23]

This chapter delineates the enduring human need for security and safety throughout history. It points to how contested notions and meanings attached to security have long been shaped by major events over time, from World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Throughout these developments and transitions, our academic and policy-oriented understandings of security have fundamentally altered, with initial versions being affixed to predominantly nationalistic and militaristic security concepts to those of the latter attached to the ideas of multilateralism and intersectionality, widening one's perceptions of the elements that form security. In the fresher conceptualizations of security can one find much deeper, humanistic elements to which the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security is strongly tied, propelling us to unearth the key referent objects of security within the state: human beings and their immediate communities. Of particular emphasis here is the critical and post-positivist concept of human security, which has in fact had a long conceptual existence in history. Human security as a policymaking tool is useful in terms of its normative prescription and utility, as it seeks to highlight persistent insecurities of individuals, as well as promote policies that ensure development, peace, and stability for communities. Towards the end, the chapter presents the Copenhagen School of thought and its idea of systemic security and the five-sector security framework,

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[23] Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, eds. R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 40-41.

which are also linked to the OSCE's comprehensive security concept and serves as the theoretical structure of this study.

The Human Quest for Security

A requisite for human society, security has long been of central importance. Safety from perilous dangers, whether physical or ontological, is, as Philippa Foot reminds us, a "fact of human existence," a condition rational for humans to yearn because, shorn of it, "social life" could not persist.[24] And, thus, from the days of yore, human beings have diligently pursued *security*—welfare, protection, freedom from peril and trepidation. In fact, the growth of the early ancient states in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Peru has been stalwartly linked with their ability to ensure order, prevent domination and exploitation, and regulate competition for limited resources that threatened the security and wellbeing of a community.[25]

Over millennia, from the Stone Age to the Roman tradition and beyond, to protect communities from attack from the outside, security strategies were employed assiduously that made use of physical and animate security resources, from walls to makeshift weaponry to canines. In due course, in the West at least, military forces appeared among the Phoenicians and the early Hebrews. "Professional" armies, land- and sea-oriented, were important to also extend the empires of monarchs, as well as maintain them, eventually giving way to the development of permanent, standing military forces and then constabulary forces.[26]

Today, this concern is ubiquitous and in addition to modernized versions of the same tools and tactics, we have also acquired antivirus software for laptops and

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[24] Philippa Foot, quoted in Ken Booth, "Foreword," in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. xv.
[25] Robert D. McCrie, "A History of Security," in *The Handbook of Security*, ed. Martin Gill (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 21.
[26] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

iPhones to remove malware and prevent the hacking of personal information. Indeed, humans have always armed themselves, erected obstructions around dwellings, communities, and now technologies, and engendered praxis to secure the foundational elements of, what Abraham Maslow terms, "basic needs."[27] As David A. Baldwin compellingly argues, security has been wielded politically to "justify suspending civil liberties, making war, and massively reallocating resources during the last fifty years."[28] Security, Ken Booth contends, "makes things happen, it is deeply politicized, and consequently is a source of much disagreement."[29] Given its nature, it is of the essence to comprehend security, both in academic and political arenas where the notion has become explicitly infused with politics and supercharged with power. This is especially required today as risks for the individual, community, and state continue to evolve due to the developments of new conditions, ideas, cultures, procedures, technologies, and perceptions of reality; likewise pushing a modification of the values and understandings attached to security in response to these burgeoning evolutions.[30]

An Ambiguous Symbol: Security and Academic Semantics

Security issues, from the "War on Terror" to Ebola to cyberattacks, have by and large permeated countries' policy agendas, and have been embellished by normative statements, empirical urgings, as well as the corresponding sweep of media attention. Despite the recurrence and prevalence of "security" and its usage to raise the salience of global issues, for a long time, in fact, there was a neglect and scarcity of information pertaining to security as a concept itself. This has been noted by a number

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[27] Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychology Review* 50 (1943): pp. 370-396.
[28] David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): p. 9.
[29] Ken Booth, "Foreword," in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. xv-xvii.
[30] Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 35(1) (1991): p. 1.

of scholars. In 1965, one study lamented that "thus far there have been very few attempts ... to define the concept of national security."[31] In 1975, Richard Smoke acknowledged that the field had "paid quite inadequate attention to the range of meanings of 'security'."[32] This lack of a deep understanding of security was perhaps on account of the fact that the concept of "security" had been an arcane, contested concept in IR and, owing to its elasticity and versatility, there had been no consensus with regards to its meaning.

However, this changed after the 1980s, when divergent approaches began defining security with different formulations, which purported to possess a clearer, more precise understanding of the concept. An enduring definition that is widely used is the one set by Arnold Wolfers, who attempted to analytically attribute a definition to the term. Wolfers maintained: "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[33] This definition is significant because it encompasses both the subjective and objective aspects of threats. It demonstrates that, akin to ephemeral and opaque terms, such as wealth, freedom and power, security "is a value of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure."[34]

A strong advocate of the multidimensionality of security, Wolfers had gone on to stress the necessity for conceptual detailing with regards to "which values to protect," "from which threats," "by what means," and "at what cost."[35] David

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[31] P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, "The Emerging Field of National Security," *World Politics* 19 (1966): p. 124.
[32] Richard Smoke, "National Security Affairs," in *Handbook of Political Science* 8, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA, 1975): p. 259.
[33] Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150.
[34] Ibid.
[35] David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): p. 23.

Baldwin builds on Wolfers' thoughts, insisting on the necessity of posing seven fundamental questions to flesh out security's multidimensionality.[36] They include:

1. *Security for whom?* It is essential to first define the "referent object," or understand who or what is being protected or secured.

2. *Security for which values?* Democracy, territorial integrity, political independence?

3. *How much security?* In terms of degree, what is the extent of security deemed required, physical or otherwise?

4. *Security from what threats?* What are the actual or potential threats to the referent?

5. *Security by what means?* What strategies are developed for trying to overcome or mitigate the threats?

6. *Security at what cost?* It is vital to recognize that something else must always be sacrificed so that resources can be devoted to a particular composition of security.

7. *Security in what time period?* Long-run and short-run security goals may differ greatly and sometimes even be in conflict.

While each of the aforementioned questions may relate to different 'dimensions' of security, the questions themselves all remain constant temporally. This is to say that although the substantive specifications or the "form of security" may change (e.g. focus on the environment, space, Arctic or maritime security vs. military security), and extend geographically (e.g. Europe vs. Middle East) and spatially (e.g. Cold War vs. the post-Cold War), the logic that permeates is that the "security concept," which is at the core of Wolfers' original definition of security, remains remarkably constant.

In answering Baldwin's proposed questions, scholars and analysts are better able to think through the nature and matters revolving around a particular approach to

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[36] Ibid., p. 8.

exploring security. Ultimately, this means examining the political choices that have shaped security, which have derived from fundamental political ideas and theories. These shape the overall choices we make about the referents to prioritize, the threats and risks to be balanced, and the strategies to be pursued.[37]

Cold War: Realism and Positivism's Underpinnings of Security

While the human quest for security has always been extant, the emergence of the Westphalian system in seventeenth century Europe ceremoniously fastened the security to the state. Exhibited throughout much of subsequent history, and then from the World Wars until the end of the Cold War, "national security" was prodigiously commensurate with military relations, national survival, force posturing, military doctrines, and weapons capabilities. The archetype evolved during the twentieth century when "alliances" were inextricably linked to regional security, which gave rise to the term "collective defence." This underpinned the notion that "a group of countries with a similar ideology faced a common military threat."[38] At the end of WWII, the UN "collective security" mechanism was established through the UN Security Council, however this too rested on the notion of "all against one" through the use of "preponderant force" against an aggressor state.[39]

Walter Lippmann helped define the security situation in the era, articulating: "A nation is secure to the extent which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."[40] The national security formulation hence entailed a universal,

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[37] Booth, "Foreword," *op. cit.*, pp. xv-xvii.
[38] Mario Laborie Iglesias, "The Evolution of the Concept of Security" (framework document, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2011), pp. 1-2.
[39] Martti Koskenniemi, "The Place of Law in Collective Security," *Michigan Journal of International Law* 17 (1996): p. 456.
[40] Walter Lipmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: The Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943).

perennial Westphalian system that was anarchical, and "security" meant the absence of a physical threat to the territorial and functional integrity of a state, deemed as the central unit of analysis or primary referent object of security.[41] Baldwin underscores forthrightly that "if military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics."[42] This security understanding is still prevalent and often invoked. Today, for example, contemporary anti-terror concerns in a "heightened security-conscious world" after September 11, 2001 (hereafter "9/11") operate within the milieu of "homeland security" (for the U.S. and many other states), although anti-terrorism certainly has repercussions for human security as well.[43]

The circumstances of the World Wars certainly translated into academia as well and developed concomitant views of the world in IR and Security Studies, known earlier as "Strategic Studies."[44] Forged by an era of military threats, IR as a discipline in the 1930s, imbued realism, especially seeing as its application was seen as successful in curbing belligerence and bringing order to Europe and Asia during WWII in comparison to the "soft" fruitless appeasement policies of the League of Nations.[45] The very slender understanding of security only intensified in pedagogy with the Cold War's nuclear threat of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD), as well as through the publication of military statecraft-centric works of classical and neorealist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer, among others. This was supplemented with theory

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[41] William T. Tow and Russell Trood, "Linkages Between Traditional Security and Human Security," in *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security*, eds. William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur, and In-Taek Hyun (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000): p. 15.
[42] David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): p. 9.
[43] James C. Hsiung, *Comprehensive Security: Challenge for Pacific Asia* (Indianapolis: University of Indianapolis Press, 2004).
[44] Booth, "Foreword," *op. cit.*, pp. xv-xvii.
[45] Peter Hough, *Understanding Global Security* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 11.

derived from the works of preceding great thinkers, such as Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes was especially influential, owing to his writings on "social contract theory" and the rule of an absolute sovereign, the *Leviathan*.[46]

Over time, despite the influence of Liberal philosophers, from Montesquieu to Mill, who pointed to the unbalanced nature of the *Leviathan*, McSweeney observes, security had nonetheless come to be defined in IR purely as "an adjective rather than a noun," or as "a commodity rather than a relationship."[47] Hough further assesses, "the human part of a human condition had been lost and the term became synonymous with *realpolitik*, the interest of the state."[48] This may have been due to the fact that mainstream IR was also "dominated by positivism," which produced narrow theoretical IR approaches that were largely, according to Laura Shepherd, "*foundationalist* (i.e. theories that assume there is an objective reality to the social world that exists independent of our perception, which acts as the foundation for our knowledge claims) and methods [that] have tended to be *quantitative*."[49]

The Détente Factor: From "National Security" to "Comprehensive Security"

While both IR's conceptualization and orchestration were emphatically "frozen in time" during 1945-1990, having been run on traditional security models, there were, nonetheless, instances where the world witnessed strategies and concepts of peace research emerging, not only in academia, but also saw it influencing politics.

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[46] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651, reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909).
[47] Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 15.
[48] Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[49] Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Theory: Paradigm and Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marsiya Zalewski (1996), p. 11; Laura J. Shepherd, "Introduction: Critical Approaches to Security in Contemporary Global Politics," in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 4.

In the 1980s, unnerved by the nuclear arms race and U.S. President Ronald Reagan's unilateral policy of nuclear deterrence, Egon Bahr's "common security" concept emerged in intergovernmental fora, such as the Palme Commission, to promote confidence and disarmament. This epitomized the view that: "International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction."[50] Common security was thus envisaged as not merely "cooperation between adversaries," but a form of "regime" that would help transcend the "security dilemma."[51] However, with the concept of "common security," the referent object of security was still the Westphalian state and the threats were almost always military in nature.

As a consequence of the Cold War's end, the upsurge of globalization, and emergent cross-border difficulties, "cooperative security" emerged in the early 1990s as a way to "build trust" between "states [and] non-state actors through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and commitment."[52] Specifically introduced in the milieu of the CSCE, the OSCE's predecessor, cooperative security was yet another concept that aimed at underscoring non-military means to ensure security.[53] Cooperative security deems that security should be rooted in common institutions and norms which should be upheld by states. Unlike common security, cooperative security acknowledges that "no [pS] should enhance its security at the expense of the security of another [pS]."[54] It further advocates that any tensions should be defused through political and institutional compromise and dialogue, that should include non-state actors, IOs, and

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[50] Olof Palme, "Introduction," in *Common Security. A Programme for Disarmament. The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues* (London and Sydney: Pan Books, 1982): p. ix.

[51] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (2) (1978): pp. 167-214.

[52] Laborie Iglesias, "The Evolution of the Concept of Security," *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[53] Takako Ueta, "The Evolution of Cooperative Security Dialogues in Europe as well as in Asia and the Pacific: CSCE, NACC, and ARF," *Helsinki Monitor* 5 (4) (1994): pp. 62-63.

[54] Pál Dunay, "OSCE—An Introduction" (presentation, OSCE Academy, September 5, 2016).

states with divergent ideologies.[55] The concept was particularly useful when there was increasing energy and natural resource competition. Cooperative security thus helped usher the development of the International Seabed Authority and the adoption of the Madrid Protocol.

The seeds of peace thinking in security were indeed crucial to the 1970s, particularly in Europe. It was during this time the continent witnessed the advancement of globally conscious, welfare-oriented, reform approaches brought about by the trio of social-democratic European leaders: Olof Palme (Sweden), Willy Brandt (Germany), and Bruno Kreisky (Austria). In particular, Brandt, former West German Chancellor, chaired the Independent Commission on International Development Issues in the late 1970s.[56] This Commission produced an influential reporting averring:

> An important task of constructive international policy will have to consist in [sic] providing a new, more comprehensive understanding of 'security' which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects … Our survival depends not only on military balance, but on global cooperation to ensure a sustainable biological environment based on equitably shared resources.[57]

Whereas global security politics had an immobile focus on military issues, the "Brandt Report" elevated the importance of poverty and other development issues. Moreover, the German *Ostpolitik* and the Helsinki Process had reconceived European security parameters. In addition, the processes of European integration and enlargements, as well as the building of a European "security community" fastened a much broader understanding of security.[58]

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[55] Wolfgang Zellner, "Cooperative Security – Principle and Reality," *Security and Human Rights* 1 (2010): pp. 64-68.

[56] Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, "Copenhagen Peace Research," in *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research*, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 3.

[57] ICIDI, *North-South: A Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues* (London: Pan Books, 1980), p. 124.

[58] Guzzini and Jung, "Copenhagen Peace Research," *op. cit.* p. 3.

While there were considerable developments that integrated peace thinking and security, it was the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords by the CSCE, and later the OSCE, which ushered in the umbrella concept of "comprehensive security," a concept closely attuned to human security. Comprehensive security recognizes that a nation's security is no longer traditionally entrenched in "national security" and "national defense," but rather it is multidimensional and covers a panoply of concerns related to Politico-Military, Economic and Environmental, and Human dimensions, all subsumed under a much wider security rubric. These various elements of comprehensive security are essentially intertwined. James C. Hsiung deftly explains with an example: "Global warming may have worldwide economic implications, and epidemics may ravage the physical and economic security of the individual (and society-at-large)."[59] Given the concept's critical and post-positivist nature (which only flourished in the post-Cold War), comprehensive security, having been born in the late Cold War era, was noticeably ahead of its time; helping reorient intellectual endeavour by embracing "critical" or "non-state-centric" approaches to security.

Today, indicative of the dynamics in the post-Cold War security environment, the concept of comprehensive security has been adopted by a wide range of IOs, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which uses the concept to "[pursue] peaceful settlement of disputes and [renounce] aggression and the threat or use of force or other actions … It also seeks to address non-traditional security challenges, including [illicit] drug (sic.) trafficking in persons, terrorism, [and] disaster relief."[60] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a classic "hard security" organization, also adopted the comprehensive security approach,

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[59] James C. Hsiung, *Comprehensive Security: Challenge for Pacific Asia* (Indianapolis: University of Indianapolis Press, 2004), p. 4.
[60] ASEAN, *ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC)* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016), http://bit.ly/2FN9E6U.

incorporating political, economic, military and civilian instruments, to counter both conventional and unconventional security challenges.[61] Furthermore, the concept has been included in the agendas of various UN-related organizations.[62] Scholars have gone on to provide a new take on the concept as well. Take for example Nayef Al-Rodhan's "multi-sum security principle," which includes five dimensions with various substrates and endorses the transcending of zero-sum game thought in pursuit of multi-sum benefits.[63] Governments have also sought to further explore the comprehensive security concept, including the U.S., Japan, and China. The European Union (EU), too, recognizes a number of diverse threats and emphasizes the importance of cooperative confidence building and arms control regimes, within the EU, as well as in its immediate neighbourhood.[64]

A Critical, Post-Positivist Paradigm: Human Security in the Post-Cold War

The Berlin Wall's dismantling and the USSR's disintegration, as well as the sudden transformations these events spawned in the global political landscape, including the propagation of both "new wars" and "humanitarian interventions," entirely altered the Cold War security paradigm and led to an awakening of the need for an expanded, much broader and deeper understanding of the security concept.

The new security understanding that eventually emerged included new referent objects and new security issues for security analysis. These were advocated by post-positivist "wideners" (those who attempted to expand "security" horizontally,

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[61] NATO, "A 'Comprehensive Approach' to Crises," last modified June 21, 2016, http://bit.ly/2IATGKO.
[62] UNDP, *Human Development Report* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) / Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, *Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualizing the Linkages* (Rome: 2003),http://bit.ly/2HOnpyS.
[63] Nayef Al-Rodhan, "Safeguarding Security in Turbulent Times—Multi-sum Security: Five Distinct Dimensions," *ETH Zurich Center for Security Studies* (2009): pp. 1-3.
[64] Rolando Mosca Moschini, "The Comprehensive Security Concept of the European Union," in *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, eds. H.G. Brauch et al. (Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 2008): pp. 651-657.

through the recognition that outside military threats are not the sole nor the largest threats to security) and "deepeners" (who attempted to expand "security" vertically, to allow for consideration of different ontological referent objects—the "who or what" being secured).[65] The foundation of this epistemology is found in Yosef Lapid's *Third Debate*, which originally questioned the constitutions of what we recognize as "everyday life," or the realist "objectivist epistemology, and illustrated how theory is inherently political as it issues claims about knowledge.[66] For Lapid, theory is actually far from being "objective" and "value-free," and is much more subjective than it seems.[67] This ethic carried over to Security Studies, which ultimately saw the rise of a plurality of critical security approaches which unreservedly challenged the orthodoxy of international security (*inter alia*, feminist security, environmental or green security, security as emancipation, post-structural security, and the post-colonial theory of security).

In this critical post-positivist grouping of security concepts, one may also find the OSCE's "comprehensive security," which offers a valuable lens to enhance our interpretation of contemporary security issues. Most significantly, comprehensive security exemplifies two fundamental shifts away from the state. The first is a focus on the external community-at-large, with a concern for transnational security issues, from the environment to the economy. Second, it represents a shift inward from the state to the individual and communities, thus recognizing the terms of human security.

As a result of ethnic and intra-state violence and the evolution of war into warfare at the end of the Cold War, human security, as a humanist alternative to

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[65] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

[66] Laura J. Shepherd, "Introduction: Critical Approaches to Security in Contemporary Global Politics," in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 4-5.

[67] Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 33(3) (1989): pp. 235-254.

state/military security and territorial integrity, sought to address the various dimensions of insecurity that ordinary people face globally on a day-to-day basis (see **Table 1**).[68] This complemented the movement for "global sovereignty," which expressed the importance of the respect of a person's individual dignity over international law. Some even went so far as deeming the state itself as "an element generating insecurity."[69] This is echoed by Peter Hough who states:

> Security *is* subjective in that individual fears do not necessarily tally with the reality of threats but individual needs are a better guide to the issues that matter than the priorities of governments. The security of governments does not equate with the security of the people they are meant to represent.[70]

Unlike other critical security approaches, human security chiefly originated from within the policymaking world and became part of political lexicon, thereby almost acting as a bridge between critical theory and practice to reflect alternatives to the traditional security paradigm.[71] The academic community broadly promoted the concept. Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor argue that the implementation of human security is "the only practical solution because, unlike the other models [i.e. geopolitics, war on terror, responsibility to protect, and liberal peace] that have old war assumptions, [human security] takes into account the logic of new wars."[72]

Table 1: Overview of the Human Security concept[73]

Instrumental Security (means)		Security Objective (ends)
Political, Military, Economic, Environmental, Social	HUMAN SECURITY	Survival, Well-being, Freedom

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[68] Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, *International Law and New Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[69] Laborie Iglesias, "The Evolution of the Concept of Security," *op. cit*., pp. 3-4.

[70] Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, *op. cit*., p. 19.

[71] Neil. S. MacFarlane and Yuen Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).

[72] Chinkin and Kaldor, *International Law and New Wars*, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

[73] Vladimir Petrovsky, "Human Development and Human Security in Eurasia," *International Journal on World Peace* 22 (4) (2005): pp. 17-75.

The first evocative diction of human security likely transpired at the "Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation for Africa," co-sponsored by the UN and the Organization for African Unity, held in Uganda. The conference is, indeed, sometimes compared to the OSCE's Helsinki Process. Its "Kampala Document" states:

> The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. [It] must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights.[74]

Two years later, the UNDP developed its *1994 Human Development Report*, which is widely recognized to have produced the first significant contemporary statement on human security.[75] The "politics of security," the report illuminated, have

> for too long been interpreted narrowly … it has related more to nation-states than to people … [whereby] security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.[76]

The inimitability of human security's conceptualization is its stress on development and humanity; "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people [for whom] a feeling of insecurity arises more from the worries of daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event."[77]

According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, human security is underscored by three pillars: "Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of human—and therefore—national security." *Freedom from fear* being the protection of the "physical integrity of human beings." *Freedom from want* being the "access to the goods and services needed to satisfy material and

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[74] African Leadership Forum, *The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa* (Kampala: 1991).
[75] UNDP, *Human Development Report* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
[76] Ibid., p. 22.
[77] Ibid., p. 3.

non-material needs." And, the *freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment* connoting "environmental protection."[78]

The anthropocentric (i.e., people-centric) concept of human security is certainly not new but, for the UN, it was an opportunity to better frame its post-Cold War mandate, which comprised work which it was, in many ways, already doing.[79] Prior to WWII, the League of Nations, although recognized as having failed to keep the peace, had applied lateral thinking in order to obviate war, creating conflict resolution instruments and agencies focused on welfare and health.[80] And while WWII imbibed the UN with more realist logic, it grew to underscore the importance of human welfare as a prerequisite for peace, deepening the contemporary understanding of security. Beyond the UN, too, human security is not an entirely new narrative. It has long been evolving in philosophical thought in the international community, at least since the times of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Hume, during which Western Europe and the Americas, in particular, struggled against the African and Indian slave trade through abolitionism, closely affiliated with modern human security objectives.[81] More pointedly, the two freedoms espoused by Annan in the new millennium, the "freedom from fear" and the "freedom from want," were, in fact, two of four "universal" freedoms identified by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his 1941 State of the Union address.[82] Furthermore, Hampson et al. suggest that the human security concept emerged from the fusion or amalgamation of a number of

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[78] Kofi Annan, *Millennium Report: We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st century* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000), p. 1.

[79] Keith Krause, "Is Human Security 'More Than Just a Good Idea'?" in *Promoting Security: But How and For Whom? Contributions to BICC's Ten-year Anniversary Conference*, eds. Michael Brzoska and Peter J. Croll (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2004), p. 44.

[80] Hough, *Understanding Global Security*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[81] Surin Pitsuwan, "Regional Cooperation for Human Security" (keynote speech, International Development Studies Conference on Mainstreaming Human Security: The Asian Contribution, Bangkok, October 4-5, 2007).

[82] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Address," *Congressional Record* 44 (1) (1941): pp. 44-47.

different concepts: (1) human development, as outlined in the first UNDP report of 1990, (2) sustainable development, as understood by the 1987 Brundtland Commission report, and, finally, (3) the "responsibility to protect," which stressed that the state has an obligation to protect its citizens, and if the state becomes the danger itself, the protection would be the responsibility of the international community.[83]

Despite its long conceptual existence, it was only after the publication of the UNDP's seminal *1994 Human Development Report* that several UN agencies and related bodies followed suit in formally adopting the concept. Hampson et al. argue that human security functions as a broad, "global public good," which continually makes it appealing to practitioners and scholars alike.[84] Even the UN's 'realist' organ charged with maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council, has become a "widener," if not a "deepener," of security by undergoing an expansive reading of its mandate. For the first time, in 2000, the Council, under the presidency of U.S. Vice President Al Gore, dealt with a non-military issue, debating the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on peace and security in Africa.[85] Later, in 2007, the United Kingdom considered exploring the links between energy, security, and climate.[86]

More recently, in 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2250, which, for the first time in history, concentrated exclusively on youth's role in peacebuilding and countering violent extremism.[87] Furthermore, the adoption of conventions, such as the 1997 Ottawa Treaty or the Optional Protocol to the

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[83] Fen Osier Hampson et al., *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 152.
[84] Ibid.
[85] UN Security Council, "AIDS in Africa," S/PV.4087 (10 January, 2000).
[86] UN Security Council, "Letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2007/186 (5 April, 2007).
[87] UN Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, "UN Security Council Adopts Historic Resolution on Youth, Peace and Security," last modified December 9, 2015, http://bit.ly/21PRzqY.

Convention on the Rights of the Child of 2000, "can be seen as legal developments motivated and facilitated by embracing human security, and prioritizing it over national security."[88]

Policy rooted in human security too has recognized that threats may lack distinguishable nemeses and people can be insecure inside a secure state.[89] Human security has very much been a cornerstone of policies promoted by liberal policymakers and institutions, such as the EU and the OSCE; humanitarian organizations, such as Oxfam; and has been incorporated into the *Weltanschauung* of liberal states, such as Canada, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland, the latter two of which are current members of the Human Security Network, an association of twelve countries that have met annually since 1999 to endorse and advance the concept of human security in national and international policies.[90]

Ambiguities and Limitations of Human Security

While human security's definitional flexibility and breadth makes it appealing for policymakers and decision makers, the many interpretations associated with the concept have often led it to be the focus of criticism and contestation as scholars see it to be "underdeveloped" given it can be considered "inclusive to the point where it is rendered meaningless."[91]

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[88] Rob McRae, "Human Security in a Globalized World," in *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, eds. Rob McRae and Don Hubert (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), p. 25.

[89] James Hamill, "From Realism to Complex Interdependence? South Africa, Southern Africa, and the Question of Security," *International Relations* 14(3) (1998): pp. 1-30.

[90] Austria Embassy Washington, "The Human Security Network," accessed September 23, 2017, http://bit.ly/2FXyKfz.

[91] Natalie Florea Hudson, Alex Kreidenweis and Charli Carpenter, "Human Security," in *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 30.

For one thing, it can be difficult to mark "where human rights and human development end, and where human security begins."[92] Hence some scholars maintain that countries and organizations have simply "repackaged" the human development-related mandates or policies that have always existed using human security lexicon. That said, demarcations have been made between the three domains by scholars, such as Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, although they still believe all are intertwined.[93] Suggestions to refine the human security concept have also included the utilization of "tangible parameters," although this would mean the development of a "threat hierarchy" that would emerge somewhat arbitrarily.[94]

Less explored in discussions of human security is its tension with state security. Take, for example, economic globalization. This integrative process has led to restrictive immigration and border policies, under the banner of "national security." While these policies are aimed to protect states and their citizens, these clearly come at the expense of migrants' wellbeing, which incongruously may even lead to the exploitation of disgruntled migrants by human trafficking networks and terrorist cells, which are also deemed poignant issues of "national security."[95]

Another notable criticism is that while human security may depart from military or state security, as critiqued by Stephen Walt, for example, the approach works with the same assumptions as traditional security, which is that "security is achievable and desirable and subsequently, threats, real and imagined, can be identified and eliminated."[96] As such, human security approaches risk employing the

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[92] Ibid.

[93] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 105.

[94] Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 116(4) (2001): p. 591; R. Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26 (2) (2001): pp. 88-90.

[95] Ibid., pp. 24-36.

[96] Stephen Walt, "Renaissance in Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (2) (1991): pp. 221-222.

military or state apparatuses in issues that can be addressed through non-military means. For example, gender-based violence qualifies as a human security issue, but this can invoke the need for apparatuses which can "reif[y] the state and state-based institutions, like the military and police, in 'solving' the insecurity issues of individuals and communities."[97] Finally, it is relevant to note that human security can also mask differences by using the very term "human," which may overlook location, context, and the politics of identity.[98]

The Copenhagen School, Securitization, and *A New Framework of Analysis*

Apart from the referent focus on the individual and communities embraced by the concept of human security, the other key shift that comprehensive security represents is a focus on the external community-at-large, revolving around a concern for transnational security issues, from the environment to the economy. This profound "widening" of security came to be characterized through an approach by the "Copenhagen School," or the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, which operated a "middle way" in the 1980s debates between security "wideners" and "traditionalists."[99] Building on Wolfers' 1962 analysis of national security and its ambiguity, the Copenhagen School does not perceive security as "objective," but rather acknowledges it is linked to power politics, "determined by actors," and "intersubjective and socially constructed."[100] Thus, the School is more preoccupied by what security *does*, or principally its *process*.

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[97] Hudson, Kreidenweis and Carpenter, "Human Security," *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.
[98] Hedi Hudson, "Doing Security as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security," *Security Dialogue* 36 (2) (2005): p. 157; Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (2) (2000): pp. 285-306.
[99] Felix Ciută, "Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation Theory," *Review of International Studies* 35 (2) (2009): pp. 301-326.
[100] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 21, 31.

Buzan was a trailblazer of this approach in the 1980-1990s, but it crystallized later when he worked with Wæver and de Wilde in devising the pioneering work, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. In it, the trio elucidate Copenhagen's basis, the "securitization theory":

> Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to as referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind.[101]

Securitization theory utilizes a "constructivist operationalist method" that examines how an issue, whether minority rights or immigration, trafficking or the environment, is labeled by an "elite actor" as a "security issue," navigating a discursive process that moves the "issue out of the normal political sphere and into the security sphere," thereby affecting policy by legitimating the use of potent measures to handle the threat.[102]

Apart from securitization theory, the Copenhagen School "widened" the meaning of security by highlighting that there were a range of security "sectors" with several referent objects that could also be threatened beyond the state which needed to be integrated into security analysis (including human security with its chief referent object being the individual).[103] The "sectoral approach" to security, introduced by Buzan, begins with three levels: individuals, states and international systems. He insists that "security *cannot* be isolated for treatment at any single level," as doing so would risk the distortions in understanding security phenomena.[104] As such, Buzan advocates for the adoption of "systemic security," which is an attempt to integrate all

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[101] Ibid., p. 5.

[102] Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.

[103] Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," *International Affairs* 67(3) (1991): p. 433.

[104] David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): p. 7.

three levels holistically into analysis.[105] In tandem, security is broadened beyond the traditional political-military understanding to include five sectors: military, environmental, economic, societal, and political, with each having its own "distinctive security dynamics" (see **Table 2**).

Weighing the Human Security Approach and the Copenhagen School

Although human security has no specific framework of analysis such as the one produced by the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, scholars, such as Rita Floyd, contemplate whether "security analysis" is *really* even the intention of proponents of human security.[106] Floyd expounds that the reality is that proponents of human security seek to identify existential threats to individuals and groups of individuals. Therefore, rather than aiming to examine who did what, when, under what conditions—and with what effects—in any given security policy, proponents of human security, through their identification of threats and key areas of security, actually carry out the process of securitizing individual human beings.

As such, if there is a need to *interpret* intersubjective security dynamics and the process of the construction of threats, securitization theory is the appropriate analytical instrument. However, as an alternative to security analysis, human security is more useful in terms of its *normative prescription and utility*, as it seeks to highlight persistent insecurities of individuals, as well as promote policies that ensure development, peace, and stability for individuals and their communities.[107]

For the purposes of this Thesis, given its focus on the development of the Comprehensive Security Index, which is conceptually-based and related to policy gui-

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[105] Buzan, *People, States, and Fear …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-248.
[106] Rita Floyd, "Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move," *Human Security Journal* 5 (2007): pp. 38-49.
[107] Ibid., p. 39.

Table 2: Division of Security Sectors, adapted from Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde's
Security: A New Framework for Analysis

Sector	Main Referent Object	Threat Description	Status today
Military	The sovereign state is the most important, although the government is a key securitizing actor and retains the right to use force. There are other actors that can attempt to securitize, even the military sector and pressure groups.	Threats are usually military threats to territorial integrity or the survival of the state This primary existential threat can be internal or external, urgent and immediate.	The status of the military sector is arguably less important because of increasing ties between countries and the development of "security communities."
Environmental	Earth, nature, and ecosystems at all levels, from local to global.	Environmental threats encompass those that are not directly linked to human activity (i.e. earthquakes, and volcanic activity), as well as those threats on account of human activity (i.e. greenhouse gas emissions).	The sector is still often ignored by traditional security approaches, although there is a growing securitization of the environment, from the Arctic to the oceans.
Economic	Global markets, states, classes, firms, individuals, etc., with much overlap.	A good recent example of an economic security threat is the global financial crisis starting in 2007, which has been securitized at various levels by a range of actors. The crisis was perceived as having the ability to threaten the survival of several referent objects, ranging from the global economic system to individual livelihoods.	The economic sector remains of critical importance, especially on account of recent economic recessions and the impact of globalization. Economic activity also often triggers security and survival issues in the other security sectors, creating an "overspill effect."
Societal	Nation	Threats can be quite broad, including migration and immigration. These can be considered threats since "societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind defined a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community."	Societal security is still very much alive today, and depends on how identity is constructed, whether related to language, history, values, culture or religion. One recent example may be Catalonia's unilateral declaration of independence from Spain in 2017. Another example is the attempted securitizing moves in the UK to pull out of the EU, triggering "Brexit."
Political	State, but can also include other unit-level actors, such as the EU, stateless groups, transnational movements, and communities, such as the Catholic Church. Also, the UN can be deemed a system-level referent object.	Non-military threats to state sovereignty.	The political sector is still relevant given its overlap with other sectors, as they are all, to some extent, political. Securitizing actors tend to be state leaders or unit leaders, as well as international mass media or NGOs.

dance, the adoption of the human security policy-based framework is beneficial, especially when combined with the Copenhagen School's "systemic security" and the "sectoral" approach to security. Tied together, the three concepts form the very foundation of the OSCE's concept of "comprehensive security," encompassing a post-positivist horizontal widening that looks beyond military threats, as well as a vertical deepening that allows for attention on a different ontological referent object—the human being—thereby considering direct and indirect life-threatening consequences for individuals.

This approach thus eliminates the need for the analyst to speculate on *what they think* is the most threatening of the myriad issues on the contemporary global political agenda and concentrates instead on analyzing urgent human security-oriented issues at hand.[108] The approach is fitting especially since individuals think of their security in different terms in the 21st century versus the Cold War era, with governments delegating greater priority to non-military issues, such as climate change, as well as military organizations, like NATO, increasingly focusing on non-military, human-oriented activities, such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

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[108] Ibid.

Chapter Three

THE POWER OF NUMBERS:
GLOBAL BENCHMARKING AND NORMATIVE AGENDAS

"For as long as we are unable to put our arguments into figures, the voice of our science … will never be heard by practical men." —J. A. Schumpeter[109]

The third chapter explores global ranking and benchmarking as methods of transnational governance. It begins with a brief look into the origins of data collection for policy purposes; a tool of statecraft during the times of empire and now a tool used to compete in an era of fast-paced globalization. Rankings have now more than ever been used to specifically keep states accountable, and NGOs and other key regulatory actors have played a leading "watchdog" role in this process, supported by technology that makes data gathering easier. The chapter elucidates the role of these organizations that are involved in ranking and rating, highlighting their considerable power in the international arena as judges, sources of governmentality, advocacy tools, and self-promoting organizations. The chapter also goes on to discuss the politics surrounding rankings themselves and how they can be used to support or contest political persuasions for gain and even influence policy interventions or reforms. While there are methodological challenges with benchmarks, which this chapter also considers, they remain increasingly valuable instruments for transparency and accountability, and can assist in producing better public policy outcomes for societies.

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[109] Joseph Schumpeter, "The common sense of econometrics," *Econometrica* 1 (1) (1933): p. 12.

Geopolitical Phenomenon: Global Rankings as "Soft Power"

Over recent years, in order to ensure accountability and transparency across a spectrum of fields, there has been growing popularity of the usage of numerical judgments and scientific authority. From evaluating employee performance to the quality of higher education institutions, rankings and ratings are so pervasive that scholars now characterize this emergence as telling of a global "audit culture."[110] This trend has been connected to the proliferation of powerful "ranking and rating organizations" (RROs) and the concomitant development of "global benchmarks" and quantitative measures in the international playing field, designed to evaluate the overall governance capabilities and performance of countries.[111] Embraced by policymakers, international governance actors, and the media, and given their ability to draw attention and make information easier to process, global benchmarks are now mounting in breadth and applicability in governance praxis. As Cooley explains, RROs possess:

> power to informally regulate global institutions and practices, to create specific normative understandings about issues like "corruption" or "failed states," to measure the openness of a state's media environment, provide benchmarks for aid distribution and other policy decisions, and reconfigure political networks among international actors and domestic bureaucracies in their efforts to respond to ranking pressures.[112]

Likewise, André Broome and Joel Quirk contend that the rise of global benchmarks "has been driven by the political appeal of numbers as information shortcuts that are frequently assumed to present unbiased facts."[113] This development has extensive corollaries for transnational governance, comprising the "dimensions and effects of

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[110] Marilyn Strathern, *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy* (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 2.

[111] "Global Benchmarking Database, v1.9," *Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation*, last modified May 28, 2017, http://bit.ly/2HKDSDW.

[112] Alexander Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings and Ratings: A Framework for Analysts," in *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance*, eds. Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 7.

[113] André Broome and Joel Quirk, "The Politics of Numbers: The Normative Agendas of Global Benchmarking," *Review of International Studies* 41 (2015): p. 815.

indirect power, expertise and agenda-setting, coordination, regulation and certification, and norm contestation and activism."[114] As tools of organizational power, or "technologies of global governance," global benchmarks can be represented as "evidence" employed by governments, NGOs, and activists to support political persuasions, and even influence policy interventions or reforms, especially when there is a fear of international opprobrium.[115] For example, as a result of an adverse ranking in the 2010 Trafficking in Persons report, Pakistan stated it endured "significant efforts" to get off the report's watchlist to improve its "stature" in the world.[116]

Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder argue that: "Because people are reflexive beings who continually monitor and interpret the world and adjust their actions accordingly, measures are *reactive*. Measures elicit responses from people who intervene in the objects they measure."[117] Hence, evaluative measures are consequential, whether intended or unintended, and controversial. In this way, global benchmarking can contribute to the diffusion of normative agendas and create "anchoring effects" by establishing referent bases for countries on specific issues, which accordingly shapes what countries "should look like, what they should value, and how they should behave."[118]

Many of the global benchmarking efforts by RROs are well known. The popular Berlin-based NGO, Transparency International, ranks states by their perceived levels of government corruption in its yearly "Corruption Perceptions Index." Other notable examples include the Fund for Peace's "Fragile States Index," the World Bank's "Worldwide Governance Indicators," Freedom House's "Freedom

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[114] Ibid., pp. 813-818.
[115] Ibid., p. 815.
[116]*Economist*, "Performance Indices: Ranking the Rankings," last modified November 4, 2014, http://econ.st/2FTXCoo.
[117] Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder, "Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds," *American Journal of Sociology* 113 (1) (2007): p. 2.
[118] Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit*.

in the World" report, the UNDP's HDI, Germanwatch's "Climate Change Performance Index," and, *inter alia*, the "Bloomberg Innovation Index." There are now established global rankings and scorecards that measure echelons in several fields, from quality of life to hunger to aid transparency to civil society. And with new evolutions of history, new forms of rankings and ratings spawn. The post-Soviet transitions, for example, gave rise to rankings, such as Freedom House's annual "Nations in Transit" report, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's "transition indicators." Moreover, 9/11 paved the path for the creation of the "Global Terrorism Index," and the UN's launch of the Millennium Development Goals led to the design of its "Progress Index" by the Center for Global Development.

While national governments have come to embrace the tenets of rankings, they have also adopted contradictory positions; publicly denouncing or distancing themselves from rankings, while privately developing policies and practices that can positively affect their position.[119] This is because, regardless of views about their merits or otherwise, rankings matter. They have acquired legitimacy because their methodology appears statistically rigorous and they appear to be the only way to compare performance and quality internationally.

Origins of Quantitative Measures of Performance

In the nineteenth century, states were growing in size, centralizing, and managing new demands for public services. Accordingly, they desired better data about their empires, and quantification eventually became a tool of statecraft as elites favoured the expansion of their bureaucratic reach and the capacity of the state. The result was

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[119] Ellen Hazelkorn, "Introduction: The Geopolitics of Rankings," in *Global Rankings and the Geopolitics of Higher Education: Understanding the Influence and Impact of Rankings on Higher Education, Policy and Society*, ed. Ellen Hazelkorn (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 1.

an "avalanche" of numbers that "profoundly transformed what we choose to do, who we try to be, and what we think of ourselves."[120] The widening reach of numeracy, advances in methodology, and the increasing validity of quantification supplemented the trend of "technicality" and "calculability," which Weber scrutinized was the "peculiarity of modern culture."[121] Cooley elucidates that "the very exercise of modern public accounting, for budgeting, planning, and infrastructure development, was founded upon the modern state's ability to successfully measure and evaluate complex social practices."[122] Thus, what it meant to be a modern state, especially in the early twentieth century, was linked to the production of public statistics, which was able to somewhat aptly describe the state's characteristics and people.[123]

The specific origin and rise of global rankings coincided with the "neo-liberal turn" and the intensification of globalization and global competition, or what Jerome Karabel refers to as the "ideological and public shift in the *Zeitgeist* towards the glorification of markets."[124] With global competition on the rise, rankings, being an important symbol of knowledge power and economic authority, possessed the powerful ability to affect investment, human capital, and the economy by commanding higher prices for products, higher financial performance, better access to capital, greater chances of survival in global marketplace, and also influencing how citizens felt towards their country. The efforts to integrate economies or governments in the international arena, in parallel with a move from state to private regulation, promulgated the globalization of an "audit explosion" that originated in the 1980s and

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[120] Ian Hacking, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-10.
[121] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 975.
[122] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings ...," *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[123] Marc Ventresca, "When States Count: Institutional and Political Dynamics in Modern Census Establishment, 1800-1993" (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Department of Sociology, 1995).
[124] Jerome Karabel, *The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), p. 514.

1990s as a way to enact transparency and accountability on a global scale.

Cooley also attributes the recent rise of RROs to the rapid proliferation of global governance networks and the rise of new, authoritative regulatory actors, such as NGOs, that monitor and play a "watchdog" role in spheres, such as health, the environment, and human rights. Consequently, several matters of accreditation, regulation, and quality assurance were and continue to be taken up at supra-national levels, such as the EU, and are part of a growing policy environment led by a pool of IOs, such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.[125] Cooley points out too that recent developments in information technology, data gathering, analysis, and dissemination have made it considerably easier for individuals and organizations, including the media, to research and compile indicators on a range of matters.[126]

What is Global Benchmarking?

Global benchmarking can be understood as a method of *transnational governance* which comparatively assesses and classifies states, and their people and institutions, typically according to their: (1) quality of *conduct* (2) quality of *design*, and (3) quality of *outcomes*.[127] The process of benchmarking to assess state performance, via rankings, indices, etc., involves the development of comparative metrics of governance which are generated by translating abstract and contested concepts and phenomena, such as democracy, good governance, transparency, and sustainability, into a quantitative format. As identified by Broome and Quirk, the numerical translation processes generally comprise of: simplification and extrapolation,

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[125] Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers, "The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm-Making and National Law-Making in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes," *American Journal of Sociology* 112 (2007): pp. 1135-1202.

[126] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 10-13.

[127] Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit.*, p. 820.

commensuration, reification, and symbolic judgments.[128] As a result, contested concepts that are being measured eventually come to "acquire fixed … meanings, and are presumed to be universally applicable irrespective of cultural context."[129]

Relevant for this Thesis is the particular importance of rankings and indices. Rankings are inherently relational, as states or institutions are assigned an ordinal ranking based on the results of common quantitative indicators. One may have single-indicator rankings (for instance, based on entrance testing success, as in Japan's *hensachi* rankings) or multi-indicator rankings (such as the European Digital Forum's Startup Nation Scoreboard, which has nearly 80 separate indicators, encompassing policy to capital access to education, that help measure EU countries' startup performance). Alex Usher explains that comparisons can also be made by either creating an ordinal ranking of countries based on their aggregate scores (and hence presenting them in a kind of tabular format, from best-to-worst), grouping countries with similar results (usually described as a "rating"), or by allowing users to manipulate indicator data on their own to construct tailored rankings (usually described as a "personalized ranking").[130] Indices specifically fall under the first genre of comparison.

An index is a "composite measure," which is the aggregation of multiple indicators, data items, or variables whose data originates from independent third-party sources, surveys, as well as bibliometric databases, and captures several factors of a multidimensional concept.[131] The aggregation and subsequent numerical translation produces a single calculation or score, like an IQ test, that can then be ranked,

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[128] Ibid., p. 815.
[129] Ibid., p. 814.
[130] Alex Usher, "A Short Global History of Rankings," in *Global Rankings and the Geopolitics of Higher Education: Understanding the Influence and Impact of Rankings on Higher Education, Policy and Society*, ed. Ellen Hazelkorn (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 14-15.
[131] OECD, *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide* (Paris: 2008).

triggering evaluation and comparison. In this respect, rankings are especially favoured in analyzing performance temporally to identify long term trends. Despite the ethical concerns surrounding the judgment of state behaviours, such as human rights compliance, capturing or even establishing trends is a critical aspect of the public appeal of international benchmarking efforts, as countries are rewarded or criticized based on their previous positions.[132]

Roles of RROs in Contemporary IR

Cooley maintains there are four major concurrent roles of RROs in the international arena today. They include being: (1) judges, (2) sources of governmentality, (3) advocacy tools, and (4) self-promoting organizations.[133] First, as *judges*, RROs, as an epistemic community, wield indirect power by providing expert judgments and specialized information about the performance of states on a gamma of issues.[134] Thus, RROs ultimately contour the framework and praxis of transnational governance, decision-making, policy models, and normative standards. Despite obvious flaws and inconsistencies, the "expert authority" of RROs is many times uncritically accepted as it is seen to "deriv[e] from their professional reputation as an organization working on the particular issue and/or their channeling of outside expertise into the production of the rating or index."[135] Some RROs take on the role of issuing judgments because certain states and public actors lack the expertise and capacity or because it is simply more cost-effective. However, as with any actor that issues judgments, RROs are constantly open to criticism regarding the

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[132] Ammar A. Malik, Kathleen C. Dominique, and Valerie Remoquillo-Jenni, "International Benchmarking: Politics and Policy," *Science and Public Policy* 40(4) (2013): pp. 504-513.

[133] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings and Ratings ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 14-23.

[134] Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46(1) (1992): pp. 1-35.; Terro Erkkilä and Ossi Piironen, "Politics and Numbers: The Iron Cage of Governance Indices," in *Ethics Integrity in and Public Administration: Concepts and Cases*, ed. R.W. III Cox (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), pp. 125-145.

[135] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings and Ratings ...," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

appropriateness, accuracy, and neutrality of their measures, assessments, and working assumptions.

Second, RROs are *sources of governmentality*. RROs provide mechanisms for global regulation and monitoring of states. They have emerged to become a part of the fabric of global liberal or neoliberal governance by instructing a certain pattern of socialization and defining what is appropriate or "normal performance." For example, the U.S.-based Cato Institute is a central actor in advocating for limited government and individual liberty, and this is furthered through its "Human Freedom Index." Oxfam is also engaged in transnational initiatives to combat poverty, having even developed a global "Food Index." This is similar to Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index," or the World Wide Web Foundation's "Open Data Barometer." In some cases, the use of rankings and ratings have remained informal, while in others, their role has been formalized and embedded within international regimes and governmental decision-making, but in all cases they have, in one way or another, shaped perceptions of norms.

Third, RROs are *advocacy tools*. Drawing from Pierre Bourdieu's "symbolic violence," RROs, as "agents of change" and "merchants of morality," can establish benchmarks primarily to exert pressure, challenge reputations, and advance their transnational advocacy efforts on particular issues. External criticism of a state's practices or labels through "naming and shaming" by an RRO can become an important focal point for both domestic and external activists, human rights organizations, and the media to strengthen their information campaigns, frame proposed solutions, and mobilize for change.[136]

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[136] Margaret Keck and Katherin Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Finally, RROs can also be considered *self-promoting organizations*. Ratings and rankings can function as branding or "flag-planting" devices used by NGOs, think tanks, institutes, and IOs to assert their jurisdictional authority in a specific global issue, stake a claim, and advance solutions to the problem. As Cooley points out, RROs still require funding and a means to ensure their survival. From a rational design and institutional choice perspective, this pushes self-interested NGOs and IOs to distinguish their advocacy efforts, compete for authority, and construct issue expertise. Thus, developing an index can be critical to elevating the organization to an international "watchdog" status, and providing a vehicle for external fundraising.[137] Cooley suggests, "once an organization generates an initial index, it becomes a signature 'calling card' activity and it is very difficult to not keep producing it."[138]

The Politics of Numbers: State Reactivity to Rankings

"Yuan slips in ranking as a world currency," "Norway is the best country to live in," "Sudan ranks at bottom end of latest UN development index"—global benchmarking, together with the conspicuous media headlines they often produce, can cement, extol, or lambaste a country's status. States, no doubt, value their standing. It is deeply connected to their power position in relation to their citizens domestically and to other states globally.[139] A good reputation legitimizes a government's course and could possibly legitimize further inaction or deflection of other priorities since a good reputation, once acquired, is embraced for some time. Serving as a precedent, it can also be useful in the negotiating room. Inversely, "being perceived as a cheater and

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[137] Ole Jacob Sending, *The Politics of Expertise: Competing for Authority in Global Governance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015).

[138] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings and Ratings ...," *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[139] Anna Van der Vleuten, "Pincers and prestige: Explaining the Implementation of EU Gender Equality Legislation," *Comparative European Politics* 3 (2005): pp. 464-488.

free-rider undermines the bargaining power of a member state."[140] Overall, benchmarking can build enough clout to transform perception and contour external audiences' reactions to rankings that produces real consequences by reinforcing and hardening global power relations and original differences between ranked states, establishing a "self-fulfilling prophesy."[141]

State concerns and reactions towards external rankings diverge substantially. Some governments and their leaders parade their performance improvements on indices as it offers positive reinforcement of government practices. The post-Soviet state of Georgia is a good example. According to the World Bank: "Among the top 20 [high-scoring] economies, Georgia, with a ranking of 9 [out of 190 countries measured], … implemented the highest number of business regulation reforms since the launch of Doing Business in 2003."[142] Georgia has, in turn, used its favourable ranking with the World Bank's Doing Business index as publicity, with the ranking mentioned in periodic advertisements in international media, with the objective to spread the news of its business-friendly status so as to attract foreign direct investments.

Elites, including those of government's official opposition, also utilize rankings as "political weapons" to identify policy priorities, kick off new schemes, or even denounce certain actions.[143] Ultimately, doing well in rankings is equivalent to an "instrument of competitive battle and influence," as they have the power to affect political fortunes.[144]

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[140] Tanja Börzel, "Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commission," in *The State of the European Union* 6, eds. Tanja A. Börzel and Rachel A. Cichowski (2003), p. 203.

[141] Danielle E. Warren and William S. Laufer, "Are Corruption Indices a Self-Fulfilling Prophesy? A Social Labeling Perspective of Corruption," *Journal of Business Ethics* 88 (2009): pp. 841–849.

[142] World Bank, *Doing Business 2018: Performing to Create Jobs—Comparing Business Regulations for Domestic Firms in 190 Economies* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2018), http://bit.ly/2u2aG9P.

[143] Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit.*.

[144] Andrei Fursenko, Former Russian Education Minister, quoted in Sophia Kishkovsky, "Russia Moves to Improve its University Ranking," *The New York Times*, last modified March 5, 2012, http://nyti.ms/2GMw7y0.

And while states are concerned with their own global standing, they are particularly keen about their relative ranking, either through "naming and shaming," or by their judgment against an ally, competitor, or regional grouping.[145] For example, officials in Ukraine are unlikely to be concerned if the country is compared to Turkmenistan or Nigeria in corruption or democratization; however, any harsh judgments in relation to neighbour and adversary Russia are circumspectly noted and studied.

It is clear that a country worries about how a loss in ranking diminishes its relative status, and that it can be perceived or stigmatized to be "falling behind" others. This is now so much of a concern that governments elicit a rationalist response by beginning to "manipulate" or "game" rankings. They modify institutional strategies and priorities, and alter resource allocation models to portfolios in order to suit a better ranking and global position. Another rationalist response is to engage by directly lobbying RROs for improvements in rankings.[146]

In certain instances, a country's rank offers opportunities for normative contestation as states can challenge the very authority and creditability of RROs in an attempt to counter negative evaluations.[147] This is especially the case if rankings can potentially inflict economic damage on recipients or exert material costs. For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been known to criticize various rankings produced on Russia, expressly those related to democracy, civil liberties, and media freedom. At the same time, however, Putin markedly leveraged Russia's position in

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[145] Alistair Iain Johnston, "Treating international institutions as social environments," *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2001): pp. 487–515 / Monika Bauhr and Naghmeh Nasiritousi, "How do international organizations promote quality of government? Contestation, integration, and limits of IO power," *International Studies Review* 14 (2012), pp. 544–545.

[146] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings ..., *op. cit.*,, p. 5.

[147] For example, see China's response to its fallen rankings in Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, Government of the People's Republic of China, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on December 3, 2014," last modified December 3, 2014, http://bit.ly/2FNr7wb.

the Western-based World Bank's Doing Business Index to buttress his goal to economically modernize his administration.[148] In another scenario, the newly launched Women, Peace and Security Index was criticized by some governments who claimed the ranking system did not consider the nuances of their country and failed to assess progress against the past.[149]

Alternatively, there are successful cases of norm socialization generated by RROs, whereby states accept judgments and uncritically implement prescriptions.[150] States, in this manner, conform by acknowledging their rankings, but also harnessing them as part of their national projects. Ellen Hazelkorn explains that a number of countries, from Canada and the U.S. to Russia and Latvia, have sought to create world-class universities, using characteristics of top globally-ranked universities and developing excellence strategies, such as forging educational and research hubs, increasing alumni grants, and raising academic standards.[151] At the other end of the spectrum, however, lower-ranked states have also been known to subsume their "deviant" standing in an attempt to spotlight an issue and gain international assistance and aid.[152]

Issues of Global Benchmarking

Whether assessing creditworthiness, measuring corruption, or judging states as "failed" or otherwise, RROs are constantly open to criticism and impugnation regarding the appropriateness, accuracy, and neutrality of their measures, assessments, and working assumptions. The issues relating to RROs and their

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[148] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings ...," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[149] Kacie Candela, "A New Index Rates the Well-Being of Women in 153 Nations," *PassBlue*, last modified October 31, 2017, http://bit.ly/2tYWSfW.

[150] Cooley, "The Emerging Politics of International Rankings ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

[151] Hazelkorn, "Introduction: The Geopolitics of Rankings," *op. cit*., p. 4.

[152] Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms and Order in International Society," *International Organization* 68 (2014): pp. 143-176; Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

benchmarks largely pertain to three main areas: (1) authority, (2) methodology, and (3) political relations.

First, **authority**. From a metaphysical standpoint, concerns arise with the increase in quantification and publication of statistics developed by RROs, which, while, paradoxically, having no norm-giving authority over them, seem to have an ideational hierarchy between them, thereby defining the norms of the international system. Broome and Quirk argue:

> the power of benchmarks chiefly stems from their capacity to create the appearance of authoritative expertise on the basis of forms of quantification and numerical representation. This politics of numbers paves the way for the exercise of various forms of indirect power, or "governance at a distance," for the purposes of either status quo legitimation or political reform.[153]

Analogous to what occurs in Bentham and Foucault's "panopticon," benchmarks can be used to "discipline," to judge and control relations which can transform behaviour, whether positive or negative. In effect, critics argue that this creates "compliant, self-policing subjects," and, in tandem, forms a group of "experts who maintain the boundaries" of what is normal and deviant.[154] To critics, this "governmentality" can wield significant influence that can "recreate social worlds" and, thus, have considerable implications for government, society, and the economy, which can elicit a process whereby elites, citizens, and governments change their behaviour in response to being evaluated.[155]

For instance, Alexandra Homolar is one of the first to dissect human security indexes and, in doing so, highlights the precise issues of benchmarking human security. He argues that when benchmarking makes essentialist verdicts concerning levels of human security (i.e. through pejorative labels, such as "not free" or "highly

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[153] Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit.*, p. 819.
[154] Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder, "Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds," *American Journal of Sociology* 113 (1) (2007): pp. 4-5.
[155] Ibid., pp. 1-40.

corrupt," which do not reflect its intense contestation), it reproduces normative suppositions about what a "secure" human life entails by judging the quality of countries' capacities and institutions in this respect. Homolar further contends that human security benchmarks serve to either underwrite the legitimation of certain regimes, or to develop international legal norms of force, such as the "responsibility to protect," which altogether narrows the goal of improving human life.[156]

Second, in terms of **methodology**, critics argue that the construction of some indices by RROs are objectively weaker than others. Broome and Quirk highlight that there are three important components that are necessary as part of the development of benchmarks, specifically their processes of "numerical translation": (1) simplification and extrapolation, (2) commensuration, and (3) reification.[157] However, these same essential components are also pointed to critics as sources of major concern.

Simplification and extrapolation are "preconditions of quantification." Simplification, at the most basic level, occurs when "complexity and contextual detail is 'lost in translation' in the pursuit of quantification and comparability."[158] Critics deem that RROs "convert complicated contextually variable phenomena into unambiguous ... and impersonal measures," leading to concerns of "cherry-picking," selectivity, and bias."[159] This underwrites issues of validation. Quantification also requires sound and complete information. However, such information and data sources, ranging from "subjective expert judgments" to "objective indicators," can often be blemished or sparse.[160] In this regard, too, scholars question the reliability of

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156 Alexandra Homolar, "Human security benchmarks: Governing human wellbeing at a distance," *Review of International Studies* 41 (2015): pp. 843-863.
157 Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 827-829.
158 Ibid., p. 827.
159 Sally Engle Merry, "Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance," *Current Anthropology* 52 (2011): p. s89.
160 Rachel M. Gisselquist, "Developing and Evaluating Governance Indexes: 10 Questions," *Policy Studies* 35 (5) (2014): pp. 516-517; Morten Jurgen, *Poor Numbers: How We are Misled by African Development Statistics and What We Can Do about It* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

rankers and whether RROs have an internal process for assessing inter-coder reliability. And, while the aggregation of multiple data sources is a method used to improve ranking accuracy, validity problems still exist, including the difficulty of assessing subtle changes identified by a few indicators; the uncertainty of sources, especially third party data; as well as potential overlapping of similar component indicators.

A second element of numerical translation that can be problematic is *commensuration*, which entails the development of common metrics for "characteristics normally represented by different units."[161] The process of commensuration imposes homogeneity as very different conditions and qualities of politics, economics, and social life are translated into common quantities so they can be easily ordered and compared. However, validity can be eroded if the data is simplified or the measures do not capture the phenomenon in question, and if different or opposite concepts are melded into one measure.

A final tricky component of numerical translation is *reification*, "the translation of complexity into stable quantifiable categories that are presumed to be universal" (required for commensuration), but are actually divorced from local cultural and social contexts. Reification "stabilizes" and "distills" the connotation of contested terms, such as "democracy" and "freedom," which in turn provide the basis for various numerical assessments, such as rankings. However, there are issues with conceptual assumptions. For example, for some, corruption's causes could be attributed to the failure of national or international institutions, while for others it can be ascribed to money-laundering, capital flight, etc. Similarly, a "failed state" in the post-9/11 context is viewed as one that poses an immediate security risk to a region or harbours terrorists. However, some argue the term should be reconceptualized so it

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[161] Broome and Quirk, "Governing the World at a Distance ...," *op. cit*., p. 827.

can be broadly defined as a state that is unable to provide basic human needs.

The last key area of global benchmarking challenges relates to **political issues**. While seemingly apolitical, rankings can incite varying state reactions and have the ability to create new political configurations and networks within and beyond the state owing to the agenda-setting and social pressures they exert. Rankings have indeed had significant success affirming and underpinning the accountability and transparency agenda, and have sparked and shaped political conversations about performance and productivity, quality and value, and impact and benefit. However, critics argue that rankings can also lead to steeper hierarchies and social stratification among countries. It can counterproductively diminish the goal of some rankings in bringing out better overall development, or it can realign government priorities for the worse.[162]

Moreover, critics argue, there are contestations regarding the Western liberal or neoliberal paradigms, assumptions, experiences, agendas, and values, from the modern state to free markets, from which many global benchmarks draw to set "universal" standards for the dimensions they measure, regardless of historical, cultural, and political variances. Liam Clegg demonstrates how this can be analytically problematic, showing how the assessments by the UN regarding the Millennium Development Goals resulted in a series of "blame games" between countries, with the developed countries querying developing countries for failures in internal governance, while the latter, in turn, blamed deficits in aid for the lack of success in realizing the Goals.[163]

In a similar vein, critics deem that RROs essentially represent the U.S. and powerful Western countries. For example, Andrei Tsygankov discovered that Freedom House was partially funded by the U.S. government and there were US

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[162] Ibid., p. 829.
[163] Liam Clegg, "Benchmarking and blame games: Exploring the contestation of the Millennium Development Goals," *Review of International Studies* 41 (2015): pp. 947-967.

officials on their Board of Directors, which he suggested eroded the NGO's authority as a "neutral" arbitrator of democratic standards, and led it to be accused of being a U.S. foreign policy tool.[164] Putin, too, has been known to criticize RROs, particularly Freedom House, as favouring the interventionist agendas of the West that undermine Russian sovereignty and domestic affairs.[165] In response to the accusations against Western-affiliated RROs, Christopher Stone highlights that some countries, from Jamaica to Papua New Guinea, decided to undertake projects that developed regionally-produced alternative indices.[166] At the same time, as Sam Schueth underscores, there are also states, such as post-Soviet Georgia and the Baltic states, which have accepted RRO findings to signal their adherence to Western standards.[167]

Another set of political concerns delineate the effect of benchmarks on a government's ability to secure economic interests and resources. Rawi Abdelal and Mark Blyth, for example, argue that the rankings of credit rating agencies have provided both "political cover" and "useful weapons" for powerful states, especially Germany, to implement their desired austerity agendas over possible solutions to the Eurozone debt and banking crisis.[168] Furthermore, rankings can also affect the aid and development resources a country may receive. A number of IOs look to benchmarks to allocate funding for states. For example, the U.S. government's Millennium Challenge Corporation utilizes the World Bank's governance indices in development

[164] Andrei Tsygankov, "The Securitization of Democracy: The Politics of Special Interests and Freedom House Ratings of Russia" (Paper presentation, "Ranking the World" Conference, Columbia University, New York, February 2012), quoted in Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2015), p. 25.
[165] Lyudmila Alexandrova, "Reaction to Freedom House Report in Russia," *ITAR-TASS Daily*, last modified February 2, 2007, http://bit.ly/2G915Ti.
[166] Christopher E. Stone, "Problems of Power in the Design of Indicators of Safety and Justice in the Global South," in *Governance by Indicators: Global Power Through Quantification and Rankings*, eds. Kevin E. Davis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 281-294.
[167] Sam Schueth, "Assembling International Competitiveness: The Republic of Georgia, USAID and the *Doing Business* Project," *Economic Geography* 87: pp. 51-77.
[168] Rawi Abdelal and Mark Blyth, "Just Who Put You in Charge? We Did: CRAs and the Politics of Ratings," in *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance*, eds. Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 39-59.

funding decisions. Nehal Bhuta also suggests that international donors, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the UK Department for International Development, employ failed states indices to allocate resources.[169]

While much is undoubtedly discussed about how states can be influenced by global benchmarking, the findings and agenda of RROs are not immune to state-led or structural power politics and may even be directly influenced by them.[170] For instance, after much criticism from health bodies and political commentators on the methodologies, components, and data sets of the World Health Organization's 2000 ranking of the world's health systems, the organization discontinued its ranking.[171]

A final way rankings can reconfigure the political space is by inadvertently driving some government officials to engage with RROs in an effort to score positively in future rankings and to save face. This can happen through "gaming the system" or through "rankings diplomacy." Concerning the former method, while Campbell's Law may operate in some cases, there are countries on the other hand that indeed imbibe reforms, such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Rwanda, all of whom previously established a "reform ministry," or passed laws to attain favourable index targets.[172] A second method whereby governments actively seek to do well in global benchmarks is through *rankings diplomacy*, which leads officials to lobby RROs to attain foreign aid, among other benefits, as well as to reassure their development commitments. And while this sort of diplomacy can be perceived as peculiar, these interactions can also produce new dialogue and solidify norm diffusion, whereby

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[169] Nehal Bhuta, "Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of Political Order" in *Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Classification and Rankings*, eds. Kevin Davis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 132-164.

[170] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton University Press, 1984).

[171] Angelina Fisher, "From Diagnosing Under-Immunization to Evaluating Health Care Systems: Immunization Coverage indicators as a Technology of Global Governance," in *Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Classification and Rankings*, eds. Kevin Davis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 217-246.

[172] Sam Schueth, "Assembling International Competitiveness ...," *op. cit.,* pp. 51-77.

countries inadvertently consent to the normative yardsticks set by RROs.

Valuing Global Benchmarks

As highlighted by Cooley and Snyder, there is a great public knowledge function associated with global benchmarks.[173] Despite methodological concerns and despite the fact their use is often confused, inappropriately deployed, and may writhe of validity issues, a number of case studies also acknowledge that the attention to and exploitation of rankings is a common and growing trend.[174] It is important to recognize too that new RROs comprehend the challenge of constructing benchmarks and are both learning methodological lessons and drawing upon related expertise when designing and crafting their new rankings and ratings. Global benchmarks can indeed be a valuable tool for transparency and accountability, and can assist in greater strategic decision-making by governments. Moreover, it can drive significant change, provide international visibility, and improve overall performance. That said, it is critical that the field of IR moves beyond the usage of indices exclusively as data sets and engage with the very core public policy questions and political choices that benchmarks embody. Given their ability to complement and buttress state legitimacy, global benchmarks will undoubtedly continue to be an important signifier of global competitiveness, demonstrating the "realpolitik" of rankings in the twenty-first century.

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[173] Jack Snyder and Alexander Cooley, "Conclusion: Rating the Ratings Craze: From Consumer Choice to Public Policy Outcomes," in *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance*, eds. Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 178-193.
[174] Hazelkorn, "Introduction: The Geopolitics of Rankings," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Chapter Four

A PROTOTYPE 'COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY INDEX'

Measuring the OSCE's multipronged "comprehensive security" concept is central to grasping its elements, benchmarking levels of peace and security, and potentially catalyzing development. The Comprehensive Security Index (CSI) formulated by this Thesis is a composite measure that captures the level of comprehensive security for 52 OSCE pS (for which data was available) across more than 365 indicators, eight component benchmarks, and three dimensions. The variables are taken exclusively from pre-existing quantitative open source data and inextricably relate to specific components of the OSCE's three comprehensive security baskets: (1) Politico-Military, (2) Economic and Environmental, and (3) Human (See **Appendix B**). The Index's methodology uses statistical normalization and aggregation techniques to calculate the CSI score.

The output of the CSI prototype tool provides a snapshot of the variation of comprehensive security wellbeing in and between pS across the OSCE region. More importantly, it offers a starting point for early warning assessment by helping to identify pS with a high or growing risk of insecurity or volatility. This information can then be used to support key decisions about crisis prevention, preparedness, and response. Unlike other indices, such as the HDI, the CSI is the first to offer greater acuity into the economic, environmental, and social circumstances of people's security, by incorporating different aspects of contemporary understandings of security, especially from a human security standpoint.

The CSI also catalyzes improvement. It can be employed to comparatively assess OSCE pS on certain aspects of comprehensive security, which can help

identify pS' strengths and weaknesses. It further allows pS to benchmark themselves against other relevant states, whether in the wider OSCE region or sub-regionally, both at the level of individual component indices, as well as with reference to the aggregate dimensional measures of comprehensive security.

The methodology of the CSI was developed through an analytical process building on a theoretical grounding rooted in a wide literature review on human security and global benchmarks. It was also based on the OSCE's comprehensive security approach, a global data audit, expert input with regards to the selection of component indices, as well as research of other index methodologies and overviews of numerical translation processes, which altogether resulted in the selection of the core set of component indices for inclusion in the CSI.

Comprehensive Security Principles

Guided by the research of Buzan's theoretical tools of "systemic" and "sectoral" security and the normative tool of human security—which altogether underlie the OSCE's security approach—a conceptual framework was developed that defines "comprehensive security," a concept which signifies the multidimensionality of security and also encompasses a people-centric referent of security in that it is focused on the attainment of sustainable security of individuals and communities in all fields (political, military, economic, environmental, cultural, social, and personal), both domestically and internationally, through co-operative means. This definition is connected to the OSCE's three broad "baskets" or "dimensions" of comprehensive security, which each comprise a complex set of characteristics. Each of the three OSCE dimensions is further elaborated into elemental components (see **Appendix C**). The component index factors, taken as a whole, represent the foundational nominal or conceptual elements that combine to produce an initial understanding of a pS' level of

comprehensive security, as well as State progress (or lack thereof) in the respective dimensions. The CSI method permits both the measurement of each component index and each of the three dimensions, together yielding an overall CSI score and ranking, based on the average of the three equally-weighted dimensions.

Index Composition and Construction

The CSI framework comprises of three architectural rudiments: dimensions, components, and indicators.

- **Dimensions** epitomize the three "broad conceptual categories" that denominate the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. The CSI is determined as the equally-weighted arithmetic mean of a pS' score on each of the three dimensions.

- Within each dimension are **components**: either two or four distinctive, but associated concepts that together form each dimension. A pS' dimensional score is calculated as the equally-weighted arithmetic mean of the components in that dimension.

- Finally, each component constitutes several **indicators** that measure a number of germane characteristics of the component developed by the respective publically available indices.

Components and Indicators

Each of the three dimensions of comprehensive security is composed of either two or four component indices (see **Table 3**). For example, the Politico-Military dimension includes the components of Government Effectiveness and Peace. Each index illuminates an associated, but unique aspect of what it means for a pS to ensure peace and stability both politically, bureaucratically, and militarily. Government

Effectiveness, as part of the CSI, denotes the extent of the quality of public administration, government consensus-building, and policy stability, among other attributes, while the Peace component describes mostly the physical or objective components of security, such as levels of violent crime, internal conflicts, and impact of terrorism. Together, the two components render a "conceptually coherent means" of capturing how a pS can minimize or increase the potential for violent conflict or apprehension.

As there is no global standard for comprehensive security performance and metrics, the CSI components are drawn, as seen by Table 3, from a set of eight ostensibly disparate indices, which are habitually discussed in isolation: The Global Peace Index, the Economic Freedom Index, the Democracy Index, etc. However, when the indices are parcelled into one index, they offer a well-established benchmark to evaluate the state of comprehensive security from the viewpoint of the OSCE. At the granular level, the eight component indices of the CSI jointly comprise over 360 indicators that are aggregated and assist in the overall measurement of comprehensive security.

Table 3: Component-Level Matrix of the CSI

Dimension	Components and Sources
Politico-Military	**Government Effectiveness** (Word Bank's World Governance Indicators) **Peace** (Institute for Economics and Peace)
Economic and Environmental	**Economic Freedom** (The Heritage Foundation) **Environmental Performance** (Yale University)
Human	**Gender Gap** (World Economic Forum) **Tolerance and Inclusion** (Social Progress Index) **Democracy** (The Economist Intelligence Unit) **Press Freedom** (Reporters Without Borders)

Selection Criteria for Component Data

Drawing from the OECD's *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators*, the selection of component indices abided by a set of evaluation criteria that included:

- **Relevance to framework:** The component indices and their concomitant indicators exhibit a theoretical or empirical link to security by measuring structural or functional relationships of the system with reference to Politico-Military, Economic and Environmental, or Human components.

- **Public availability:** The indicator data of the component indices must be available online to the public to ensure transparency and independent replication.

- **Established scientific methodology:** The component indices are hinged on peer-reviewed scientific data, data from reputable IOs, or related institutions focused on data assemblage and, overall, captures what it purports to measure.

- **Data quality:** The empirical data represents the best and most currently available measure or "best available data" proxy.

- **Spatial coverage:** The dataset must have sufficient and consistent global and temporal coverage (i.e. time series).[175]

Calculating the CSI

Using the OECD's *Handbook*, the construction of the composite CSI involved two main steps: normalization and aggregation.[176] **Normalization** is a technical procedure that adjusts data such that they use the same unitless scale and possess the same range so they can be comparable across indicators and the information can be combined in a meaningful way. For example, all indicators need to be estimated such that higher or

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[175] OECD, *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide* (Paris: 2008).
[176] Ibid.

lower values consistently mean that the achievement is better or worse, respectively. The approach taken by the author was to rescale the set of values from 0 to 10, with 0 denoting a low CSI performance and 10 describing the optimum score.

For the indices on Government Effectiveness (*a*), Economic Freedom (*c*), Environmental Performance (*d*), and Tolerance and Inclusion (*f*), which all had scores ranging from 0 to 100, the raw component value for each country, or X, was divided by 10 to be normalized.

Formula 1 $$Component_{acdf} = \frac{X_{acdf}}{Best\ Case_{CSI}}$$

Given its scaling from 1 to 5, and 5 signifying the lowest score for peace in a country, the Global Peace Index's raw component values (*b*) were inverted by subtracting them from the Index's best case value and then multiplied by two for normalization.

Formula 2 $$Component_b = (Best\ Case_b - X_b) \times 2$$

For the Global Gender Gap Index (*e*), which ranged from 0 to 1, raw values were multiplied by 10.

Formula 3 $$Component_e = X_e \times Best\ Case_{CSI}$$

The raw component values for the Democracy Index (*g*) fell naturally between 0 and 10, thus their scores remained the same.

Formula 4 $$Component_g = X_g$$

An inversion was completed for the Press Freedom Index (*h*, with potential values of 0 to 100) given that a higher number originally reflected worse press freedom. As such, the raw data was subtracted from their best case value and then divided by ten to standardize the data.

Formula 5 $\quad Component_h = \dfrac{(Best\ Case - X_h)}{Best\ Case_{CSI}}$

Aggregation then proceeded in two steps. First, the normalized component index scores were aggregated for each of the OSCE's three security dimensions and they were subsequently aggregated across all three CSI dimensions (*a*, *b*, and *c*).

The **arithmetic mean** was used to aggregate the component scores within each dimension. As an example, the formula that was applied to calculate the scoring for the Human dimension (*c*) (which contains the four components of gender, tolerance and inclusion, democracy, and media freedom) is as follows:

Formula 6 $\quad Dimension_c = \dfrac{1}{4}\sum_{efgh} Component_{efgh}$

Finally, a sum or average of all three dimensions was done in order to receive the CSI scores for each pS, and a ranking was then applied to form the final CSI prototype tool (See **Table 4** and **Figure 1**). In the current iteration of the CSI, scores range from 4.42 to 8.55, based on an OSCE pS' CSI score being calculated as such:

Formula 7 $\quad CSI = \dfrac{1}{3}\sum_{abc} Dimension_{abc}$

H₁: Quantifying and Grasping Comprehensive Security through the CSI

The OSCE, while having been recognized for championing the concept of comprehensive security since the early 1970s, to date, has not exhibited a real initiative to apply quantification to evaluate its pS according to its three dimensions of security. This is the case despite repeated recommendations for systematic data collection in a range of issue areas, as well as the provision of public access to this data. To understand patterns of threats and their risk, it is vital to have numbers, which can allow for tracking, monitoring, and comparison among pS. Doing so is useful to understand progress or regressions in comprehensive security, as well as

pS	Country Code	Comprehensive Security Index	Politico-Military Dimension	Economic and Environmental Dimension	Human Dimension	Government Effectiveness (World Governance Indicators, World Bank)	NORMALIZED	Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace)	NORMALIZED	POL-MIL DIM, OVERALL	Economic Freedom Index (The Heritage Foundation)	NORMALIZED	Environmental Performance Index (Yale University)	NORMALIZED	ECON-ENV DIM, OVERALL	Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum)	NORMALIZED	Tolerance and Inclusion (Social Progress Index)	NORMALIZED	Democracy Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit)	NORMALIZED	Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders)	NORMALIZED	HUMAN DIM, OVERALL
Albania	ALB	6.28	5.71	6.94	6.20	52.40	5.24	1.91	6.18	5.71	64.40	6.44	74.38	7.44	6.94	0.70	7.04	48.60	4.86	5.91	5.91	29.92	7.01	6.20
Armenia	ARM	6.09	5.26	7.60	5.42	49.52	4.95	2.22	5.56	5.26	70.30	7.03	81.60	8.16	7.60	0.67	6.69	39.84	3.98	3.88	3.88	28.79	7.12	5.42
Austria	AUT	8.06	8.33	7.95	7.91	91.83	9.18	1.27	7.47	8.33	72.30	7.23	86.64	8.66	7.95	0.72	7.16	73.76	7.38	8.41	8.41	13.18	8.68	7.91
Azerbaijan	AZE	5.61	5.03	7.37	4.42	49.04	4.90	2.43	5.15	5.03	63.60	6.36	83.78	8.38	7.37	0.68	6.84	39.90	3.99	2.65	2.65	57.89	4.21	4.42
Belarus	BLR	5.59	4.66	7.05	5.07	36.06	3.61	2.14	5.72	4.66	58.60	5.86	82.30	8.23	7.05	0.74	7.37	48.00	4.80	3.54	3.54	54.32	4.57	5.07
Belgium	BEL	7.68	7.80	7.40	7.83	86.54	8.65	1.53	6.95	7.80	67.80	6.78	80.15	8.02	7.40	0.75	7.45	75.17	7.52	7.77	7.77	14.18	8.58	7.83
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	5.61	4.86	6.17	5.80	37.98	3.80	2.04	5.93	4.86	60.20	6.02	63.28	6.33	6.17	0.69	6.85	43.42	4.34	4.87	4.87	28.45	7.16	5.80
Bulgaria	BGR	6.88	6.64	7.57	6.44	65.38	6.54	1.63	6.74	6.64	67.90	6.79	83.40	8.34	7.57	0.73	7.26	49.34	4.93	7.01	7.01	34.46	6.55	6.44
Canada	CAN	8.28	8.39	8.18	8.28	95.19	9.52	1.37	7.26	8.39	78.50	7.85	85.06	8.51	8.18	0.73	7.31	81.87	8.19	9.15	9.15	15.26	8.47	8.28
Croatia	HRV	6.84	6.82	7.32	6.37	69.71	6.97	1.67	6.67	6.82	59.40	5.94	86.98	8.70	7.32	0.70	7.00	45.36	4.54	6.75	6.75	27.91	7.21	6.37
Cyprus	CYP	7.12	6.98	7.40	6.99	78.37	7.84	1.94	6.12	6.98	67.85	6.79	80.24	8.02	7.40	0.68	6.84	52.96	5.30	7.65	7.65	18.26	8.17	6.99
Czech Republic	CZE	7.58	7.63	7.90	7.21	79.81	7.98	1.36	7.28	7.63	73.34	7.33	84.67	8.47	7.90	0.69	6.90	57.86	5.79	7.82	7.82	16.66	8.33	7.21
Denmark	DNK	8.28	8.61	7.81	8.42	99.04	9.90	1.34	7.33	8.61	75.05	7.51	81.21	8.12	7.81	0.75	7.54	78.29	7.83	9.20	9.20	8.89	9.11	8.42
Estonia	EST	7.68	7.42	8.38	7.23	82.69	8.27	1.71	6.58	7.42	79.06	7.91	88.58	8.86	8.38	0.75	7.47	50.25	5.03	7.85	7.85	14.31	8.57	7.23
Finland	FIN	8.44	8.32	8.23	8.76	96.63	9.66	1.52	6.97	8.32	73.99	7.40	90.68	9.07	8.23	0.85	8.45	84.04	8.40	9.03	9.03	8.59	9.14	8.76
France	FRA	7.51	7.66	7.58	7.30	89.90	8.99	1.84	6.32	7.66	63.30	6.33	88.20	8.82	7.58	0.76	7.55	61.16	6.12	7.92	7.92	23.83	7.62	7.30
Georgia	GEO	6.39	6.47	7.05	5.64	71.15	7.12	2.08	5.83	6.47	75.99	7.60	64.96	6.50	7.05	0.68	6.81	26.30	2.63	5.93	5.93	27.96	7.20	5.64
Germany	DEU	8.05	8.21	7.90	8.04	94.23	9.42	1.50	7.00	8.21	73.80	7.38	84.26	8.43	7.90	0.77	7.66	73.64	7.36	8.63	8.63	14.80	8.52	8.04
Greece	GRC	6.53	6.13	7.04	6.44	62.50	6.25	2.00	6.00	6.13	55.00	5.50	85.81	8.58	7.04	0.68	6.80	47.58	4.76	7.23	7.23	30.35	6.97	6.44
Hungary	HUN	6.97	6.97	7.52	6.42	69.23	6.92	1.49	7.01	6.97	65.79	6.58	84.60	8.46	7.52	0.67	6.69	50.96	5.10	6.72	6.72	28.17	7.18	6.42
Iceland	ISL	8.55	8.41	8.24	9.00	90.38	9.04	1.11	7.78	8.41	74.39	7.44	90.51	9.05	8.24	0.87	8.74	93.04	9.30	9.50	9.50	15.30	8.47	9.00
Ireland	IRL	8.27	8.02	8.17	8.63	88.46	8.85	1.41	7.18	8.02	76.74	7.67	86.60	8.66	8.17	0.80	7.97	86.21	8.62	9.15	9.15	12.40	8.76	8.63
Italy	ITA	7.12	6.84	7.35	7.16	71.63	7.16	1.74	6.53	6.84	62.53	6.25	84.48	8.45	7.35	0.72	7.19	63.66	6.37	7.98	7.98	28.93	7.11	7.16
Kazakhstan	KAZ	5.87	5.58	7.11	4.92	51.44	5.14	1.99	6.02	5.58	68.99	6.90	73.29	7.33	7.11	0.72	7.18	49.12	4.91	3.06	3.06	54.55	4.55	4.92

Country	Code																						
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	5.40	3.67	6.71	5.81	17.79	1.78	2.22	5.57	3.67	61.13	6.11	73.13	7.31	6.71	0.69	6.87	44.73	4.47	4.93	4.93	30.16	6.98	5.81
Latvia	LVA	7.40	7.27	8.03	6.89	78.85	7.88	1.67	6.66	7.27	74.80	7.48	85.79	8.58	8.03	0.75	7.55	44.50	4.45	7.31	7.31	17.38	8.26	6.89
Lithuania	LTU	7.49	7.38	8.06	7.04	82.21	8.22	1.73	6.54	7.38	75.80	7.58	85.49	8.55	8.06	0.74	7.44	52.52	5.25	7.47	7.47	19.95	8.01	7.04
Luxembourg	LUX	8.24	8.32	8.12	8.28	93.27	9.33	1.34	7.32	8.32	75.90	7.59	86.58	8.66	8.12	0.73	7.34	84.26	8.43	8.81	8.81	14.43	8.56	8.28
Malta	MLT	7.45	6.93	7.81	7.62	77.40	7.74	1.94	6.12	6.93	67.70	6.77	88.48	8.85	7.81	0.66	6.64	78.46	7.85	8.39	8.39	23.84	7.62	7.62
Moldova	MDA	5.78	4.55	6.73	6.07	29.81	2.98	1.94	6.12	4.55	58.00	5.80	76.69	7.67	6.73	0.74	7.41	37.30	3.73	6.01	6.01	28.83	7.12	6.07
Mongolia	MNG	6.07	5.72	5.96	6.51	50.48	5.05	1.80	6.40	5.72	54.80	5.48	64.39	6.44	5.96	0.71	7.05	51.41	5.14	6.62	6.62	27.61	7.24	6.51
Montenegro	MNE	6.32	5.93	7.04	5.97	57.69	5.77	1.95	6.10	5.93	62.00	6.20	78.89	7.89	7.04	0.68	6.81	46.38	4.64	5.72	5.72	32.79	6.72	5.97
Netherlands	NLD	8.16	8.28	7.89	8.31	96.15	9.62	1.53	6.95	8.28	75.80	7.58	82.03	8.20	7.89	0.76	7.56	77.73	7.77	8.80	8.80	8.76	9.12	8.31
Norway	NOR	8.47	8.44	8.05	8.91	98.56	9.86	1.49	7.03	8.44	74.00	7.40	86.90	8.69	8.05	0.84	8.42	81.74	8.17	9.93	9.93	8.79	9.12	8.91
Poland	POL	7.06	7.00	7.48	6.69	73.56	7.36	1.68	6.65	7.00	68.30	6.83	81.26	8.13	7.48	0.73	7.27	50.38	5.04	6.83	6.83	23.89	7.61	6.69
Portugal	PRT	7.79	8.02	7.56	7.78	85.58	8.56	1.26	7.48	8.02	62.60	6.26	88.63	8.86	7.56	0.74	7.37	76.17	7.62	7.86	7.86	17.27	8.27	7.78
Romania	ROU	6.57	5.80	7.65	6.26	48.08	4.81	1.60	6.80	5.80	69.70	6.97	83.24	8.32	7.65	0.69	6.90	39.43	3.94	6.62	6.62	24.29	7.57	6.26
Russian Federation	RUS	5.30	4.16	7.03	4.72	44.23	4.42	3.05	3.91	4.16	57.10	5.71	83.52	8.35	7.03	0.69	6.91	36.15	3.62	3.24	3.24	49.03	5.10	4.72
Serbia	SRB	6.42	5.90	6.88	6.47	55.77	5.58	1.89	6.22	5.90	58.90	5.89	78.67	7.87	6.88	0.72	7.20	48.87	4.89	6.57	6.57	27.60	7.24	6.47
Slovakia	SVK	7.30	7.21	7.74	6.94	76.44	7.64	1.61	6.78	7.21	65.73	6.57	88.98	8.90	7.74	0.68	6.79	50.02	5.00	7.29	7.29	13.26	8.67	6.94
Slovenia	SVN	7.48	7.82	7.23	7.38	83.65	8.37	1.36	7.27	7.82	59.20	5.92	85.42	8.54	7.23	0.79	7.86	63.76	6.38	7.51	7.51	22.26	7.77	7.38
Spain	ESP	7.70	7.59	7.62	7.87	83.17	8.32	1.57	6.86	7.59	63.57	6.36	88.91	8.89	7.62	0.74	7.38	77.99	7.80	8.30	8.30	19.92	8.01	7.87
Sweden	SWE	8.34	8.22	8.27	8.55	94.71	9.47	1.52	6.97	8.22	74.91	7.49	90.43	9.04	8.27	0.82	8.15	78.80	7.88	9.39	9.39	12.33	8.77	8.55
Switzerland	CHE	8.44	8.60	8.42	8.30	99.52	9.95	1.37	7.25	8.60	81.45	8.15	86.93	8.69	8.42	0.78	7.76	75.17	7.52	9.09	9.09	11.76	8.82	8.30
Tajikistan	TJK	4.87	3.46	6.56	4.58	14.42	1.44	2.26	5.47	3.46	58.17	5.82	73.05	7.31	6.56	0.68	6.79	46.83	4.68	1.89	1.89	50.34	4.97	4.58
TFYRO Macedonia	MKD	6.26	5.68	7.44	5.67	56.25	5.63	2.13	5.73	5.68	70.70	7.07	78.02	7.80	7.44	0.70	6.96	41.13	4.11	5.23	5.23	36.09	6.39	5.67
Turkey	TUR	5.56	4.96	6.65	5.09	54.81	5.48	2.78	4.45	4.96	65.23	6.52	67.68	6.77	6.65	0.62	6.23	41.50	4.15	5.04	5.04	50.76	4.92	5.09
Turkmenistan	TKM	4.42	3.31	5.88	4.06	11.54	1.15	2.27	5.46	3.31	47.37	4.74	70.24	7.02	5.88	-	6.79	59.56	5.96	1.83	1.83	83.44	1.66	4.06
Ukraine	UKR	5.22	3.40	6.39	5.86	31.73	3.17	3.18	3.63	3.40	48.09	4.81	79.69	7.97	6.39	0.70	7.00	40.52	4.05	5.70	5.70	32.93	6.71	5.86
United Kingdom	GBR	7.91	7.85	8.22	7.67	92.79	9.28	1.79	6.43	7.85	76.43	7.64	87.98	8.80	8.22	0.75	7.52	69.49	6.95	8.36	8.36	21.70	7.83	7.67
United States	USA	7.59	7.34	7.99	7.45	91.35	9.13	2.23	5.54	7.34	75.14	7.51	84.72	8.47	7.99	0.72	7.22	68.30	6.83	7.98	7.98	22.49	7.75	7.45
Uzbekistan	UZB	4.92	4.41	5.80	4.55	30.77	3.08	2.13	5.74	4.41	52.26	5.23	63.67	6.37	5.80	-	6.79	55.78	5.58	1.95	1.95	61.15	3.89	4.55

Table 4:Final CSI Dimensional and Component Statistics across OSCE pS

Figure 1: Bar graph representation of the CSI ranking

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY INDEX

CSI Aggregate Score

| OSCE Participating State	Score
ISL	8.55
NOR	8.47
CHE	8.44
FIN	8.44
SWE	8.34
DNK	8.28
CAN	8.28
IRL	8.27
LUX	8.24
NLD	8.16
AUT	8.06
DEU	8.05
GBR	7.91
PRT	7.79
ESP	7.70
EST	7.68
BEL	7.68
USA	7.59
CZE	7.58
FRA	7.51
LTU	7.49
SVN	7.48
MLT	7.45
LVA	7.40
SVK	7.30
CYP	7.12
ITA	7.12
POL	7.06
HUN	6.97
BGR	6.88
HRV	6.84
ROU	6.57
GRC	6.53
SRB	6.42
GEO	6.39
MNE	6.32
ALB	6.28
MKD	6.26
ARM	6.09
MNG	6.07
KAZ	5.87
MDA	5.78
BIH	5.61
AZE	5.61
BLR	5.59
TUR	5.56
KGZ	5.40
RUS	5.30
UKR	5.22
UZB	4.92
TJK	4.87
TKM	4.42

Legend

High CSI
Medium CSI
Low CSI

the overall progress or regressions of pS in meeting OSCE commitments, while justifying the organization's security investments.

The methodology delineated in the previous section demonstrates that by formulating a synthesis of existing data and indices corresponding to the three dimensions of the OSCE, an index of quantifying comprehensive security can be developed. This prospect can help determine how the OSCE pS compare in meeting their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act (see **Appendix A** and **Figure 2**). Measuring multidimensional security risks to human life has hitherto been characterized by the lack of a specific global human security index, hence the CSI may be considered a starting point that contributes to security forecasting. The insights derived from the CSI can be beneficial for OSCE decision makers who require information about the utility and impact of security standards and investments. The information from the CSI can also be useful when raising concerns to pS in the Permanent Council with regards to worrying developments, effectuating crisis and disaster preparedness and response, as well as verifying the need to issue preventive measures, such as an observer mission or engaging in preventive diplomacy.

According to the current iteration of the CSI, the OSCE pS with the highest CSI scores are those that belong to the Nordic region; Western, Southwestern, and Central Europe; and Canada. At the CSI's mid-scale, possibly "flawed democracies" are found, those from the Baltics, the Visegrád/Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe, but also the U.S. The lower tier rankers are attributed to "hybrid regimes" and, lastly, the so-called "authoritarian regimes" of the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Russia, and post-Soviet Central Asia.

Figure 2: Comparing High, Medium, and Low CSI scores of sample pS

Iceland (8.55), Norway (8.47), Switzerland (8.44), Finland (8.44), and Sweden (8.34) feature strongly at the top of the CSI. Despite increased economic hardship, a higher degree of militarization through increase in exports of air defence systems and advanced weaponry, as well as having also been afflicted by terrorism in recent years, there is plenty of progress in other areas of the Politico-Military and Human dimensions that have kept these countries at the top vis-á-vis comprehensive security. The Nordic pS and Switzerland all possess robust education systems, a commitment to open markets, protected private property, private sector growth, and consistent adherence to the rule of law, while they are some of the least corrupt countries in the world. Moreover, women have a major presence in the legislatures and other branches of government, and an increasing presence in the workforce and top management positions. These pS also exhibit a strong concern for the environment, with low levels of pollution, good preservation of fish stocks, and an improvement in waste water treatment, among other successes. This is all topped off with an increasing sense of

community and social capital.

According to the CSI, the U.S. has a medium score of 7.59. The U.S. suffered a blow with the financial crisis of 2008-2009, and is still undergoing economic recovery. That said, the U.S. remains the world's best business environment, but despite being one of the world's prosperous countries, it is susceptible to violence and terrorism. Falling levels of tolerance has resulted in weaker social capital and has fuelled support for populists, like Donald Trump, among others, all leading to a potential contracting of American openness in the world. The U.S. also continues to face serious issues in healthcare, such as obesity, addition to licit and illicit drugs, and mental health.

France (7.51), Malta (7.45), Italy (7.12), Cyprus (7.12), and Greece (6.53) are the only five non-post-communist European countries that have a mid-level CSI ranking. Two worth investigating are Italy and Cyprus. Considering Italy's wealth and relatively good performance in education and health, its score would normally stand out. However, a deeper probe reveals that there are host of issues, including Italy's relatively low labour force participation rate, especially among females, as well as high unemployment. There is a longstanding governance challenge in the country exemplified by the fact that Italy has had 63 governments since its formation as a Republic in 1946. Italy also faces relatively high rates of corruption and low government transparency as compared to many other Western states, and is overburdened by migration from North and sub-Saharan Africa.

Cyprus too has not fared well. The 2012-2013 financial crisis starkly squeezed a number of the country's important sectors and led to bank failures and high unemployment. These have consequently affected the confidence Cypriots have had in their government institutions and perhaps has also played a role in them having the

lowest tolerance towards immigrants in Western Europe. There have, however, been some positive steps, such as the development of a healthier business climate and the legalization of civil unions. Nevertheless, a stagnation in peace talks between Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus may be seen as affecting Cyprus' medium CSI score.[177]

A low level performer in the CSI is Azerbaijan (5.61). Although the country is one of the wealthiest in the region (given its petroleum extraction and reserves), personal freedom and governance issues limit Azerbaijan's progress in the CSI. Much power is concentrated in the hands of President Ilham Aliyev and this has only been enhanced in a September 2016 referendum that did not include much public debate. Corruption is also rampant and there have also been several cases of imprisonment of journalists and bloggers, as well as violent repression of protests against price hikes and unemployment. The country has done well in carrying out reforms to improve private sector development, and is trying to benefit from regional connectivity by investing in several transport corridors. Interestingly, Azerbaijan fares well in the environmental category, with emissions having, over time, decreased by more than twenty-two million tons since 1990. It has also increased its tree cover, protected areas, and nature reserves. Burning household waste is strictly prohibited as well.[178] The country's CSI, however, was likely impacted by the protracted conflict with neighbouring Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lastly, the Central Asian states are low-lying on the CSI and tend to do poorly across all component indices (see **Figure 3** and **Figure 4**). Central Asia's worst performer (and the worst of the 52 pS analyzed for this study) is Turkmenistan (4.42),

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[177] Vincent L. Morelli, "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive," *Congressional Research Service*, February 14, 2018.

[178] Amina Nazarli, "Azerbaijan improves environmental performance," *Azernews*, last modified February 2, 2016, https://bit.ly/2r75Sfp.

Figure 3: CSI Profiles of the OSCE Central Asian pS

Figure 4: Juxtaposing CSI Profiles of the OSCE Central Asian pS

even though the country possesses the world's sixth largest natural gas reserves. President Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov's near one's have virtual monopoly over the country's economic sectors which has dampened private sector growth. Among other issues are: the judicial system, which is subservient to the president; the legal system, which does not effectively enforce contracts; restrictions on foreign investments; and an absence of property rights and effective regulatory systems. Citizens are also known to undergo physical surveillance and monitoring, can be subjected to forced labour, and their freedom of movement is restricted. A lack of transparency permeates all spheres of governance in Turkmenistan, with elections not being free and fair, and public officials engaging in bribery. The government also controls nearly all media, and academic institutions, while religious groups experience restrictions and harassment.[179]

## H$_1$: Correlating the CSI to Socio-Economic Output

Having assessed how the OSCE pS fare in the CSI, it is useful to understand the connection between comprehensive security and a variety of measures of social and economic progress. To begin with, a correlation analysis was conducted to assess the relationship between the CSI and the UNDP's HDI. While conceptually similar, the CSI is, in fact, different from "quality of life" or "wellbeing" measures, such as the HDI, in that it contains a more extensive set of components and indicators. Although the HDI has revolutionized discussions about human development, a longstanding deficiency of the HDI is that it focuses only on the dimensions of "long and healthy life," "knowledge," and "a decent standard of living."[180] In contrast, the CSI combines political, military, economic, environmental, and social aspects, inclu-

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[179] Human Rights Watch, "Turkmenistan: Events of 2015," accessed November 1, 2017, https://bit.ly/2e1vOC4.

[180] UNDP, "Human Development Index (HDI)," accessed November 1, 2017, http://bit.ly/1kkByXA.

Figure 5

ding human rights, as part of efforts to assess pS performances. The linear bivariate correlation analysis of the two indices produced a Pearson's correlation coefficient of $r = 0.92$ ($R^2 = 0.85$), suggesting a very strong uphill or positive relationship (see **Figure 5**); thus, 85% of the variability between CSI and HDI is accounted for, suggesting that more comprehensively secure pS are generally associated with higher levels of human development and democratization, and that the CSI and HDI are good predictors of each other. This is consistent as the HDI also takes into consideration some of the factors of CSI, particularly in the socio-economic domains.

In the upper right hand quadrant of Figure 5 are pS, such as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, which score high on both CSI and HDI. Central Asian, Caucasian, some Balkan pS, and Turkey are visualized at the bottom left. The scores overall endorse the empirical research of Acemoğlu et al., who, through examining countries between 1960 to 2010, show that democracy, in particular, positively affects

"economic reforms, private investment, the size and capacity of government, and a reduction in social conflict," and, moreover, show that over the past 50 years, democracy has led to a six percent rise globally in GDP.[181]

The CSI-HDI relationship is also in line with a number of other works. Amartya Sen, for instance, provides a specific theorization of how famines occur precisely in societies where there is a lack of strong democratic institutions (i.e. free and fair elections, a robust judiciary, and civil society) that uphold basic rights. Sen also suggests that, with the barring of free press, the information needed to push for a government response to the crisis is thus not circulated.[182] Sen's example specifically highlights the argument of Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, who state that rather than emphasizing human security *apriori* over human development or vice versa, which is a pointless chicken and egg debate, it is better to envision them as intersecting one another or as "co-conditionalities." They point out that human security is defined by "an approximate threshold of security conditions," which are essentially based on the freedom from fear and want, while development is a "gradient of human conditions," which, when positive, can be conducive to the enhancement of human security. They argue that human security and development are "indistinctly linked given that progress in one enhances the choices of progress in another, while failure in one increases risk of failure of another."[183] In this context, human rights is especially regarded as a bridge between human security and development, in view of the fact that if human rights are habitually violated, then neither human development nor human security may yield.

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[181] Daron Acemoğlu et al., "Democracy Causes Economic Development?," *VOX*, last modified May 19, 2014, http://bit.ly/2E5Vbhr.

[182] Michael Massing, "Does Democracy Avert Famine?," *New York Times*, last modified March 1, 2003, http://nyti.ms/2FPscU0.

[183] Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, "Human Security and Human Development ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 98-122.

Figure 6

On a different note, when it comes to examining whether and how comprehensive security and income (in)equality are related among the OSCE pS, a correlation analysis was carried out between CSI scores and scores for the Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality). This produced a coefficient of *r* = -0.27, suggesting that the higher a pS ranks on the CSI, the lower its inequality (see **Figure 6**). However, an R^2 of 0.07 indicates an extremely weak relationship between the two variables. Although the correlation is a weak one, its negative relation is sensible given that economically unequal states tend to be less secure. The scatter graph shows how individual pS line up in terms of the CSI and income inequality. Again, the Central Asian, Eastern European, Caucasian, some Balkan pS, Russia and Turkey factor in the quadrants on the left, and, on the right, the Nordic, Central European countries and Canada are found to take the lead. This is in line with the findings of the Centre for the Study of Living Standards, which explored linkages between productivity

Figure 7

THE CSI AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT

productivity and social development, and explained that when there is a greater or an increase in the level of income inequality, there is less of an increase in productivity and income that could reduce poverty.[184] This means then that an insistence and focus on productivity and growth is essential for poverty reduction in developing countries.

Another relevant relationship that was examined was that between the CSI and the standard measure of economic output, in terms of per capita GDP. The correlation analysis of the two measures yielded a coefficient of $r = 0.80$ (R2 = 0.64), signifying a strong uphill or positive linear relationship, as also indicated by the fitted line scope (see **Figure 7**). Towards the upper right hand corner of the graph are pS, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Luxembourg and Germany, states which are concurrently rich on a per capita basis and score high on the CSI. Towards the bottom left hand corner

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[184] "Productivity Growth and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries," *Centre for the Study of Living Standards*, September 29, 2003, http://bit.ly/2FTNyLT.

are countries with low per capita income and low CSI, such as Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Given the positive association between the CSI and per capita GDP, it can be said that comprehensively secure pS are also those that are more productive and competitive. Seymour Martin Lipset argued that greater wealth and economic development can create more propitious conditions for open politics, and thus can create better chances for democracy.[185] While Lipset's formulation has been both empirically qualified and refined, most studies find this to be case.[186] Contemporary security debates have even linked together economics and security using concepts such as "freedom from want" and the "right to development."[187]

Here, it is also relevant to bear in mind that while some pS are relatively prosperous in terms of GDP per capita, such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, these hydrocarbon-reliant pS fare low on the CSI. Several works, for example, have illustrated that there is a negative correlation between oil (via its "corruption effect") and open polities, suggesting that fossil fuel-based economies face distinct democratization challenges.[188] Unlike other oil dependent countries, however, certain pS, like Norway, have had a lengthy experience with stable, open politics, already having set up strong institutions, even prior to becoming a mass hydrocarbon producer in the 1970s.

Hypothesis 1 Conclusions

The above analysis demonstrates that while the OSCE advances the comprehensive security concept, it has not gone further to quantify and evaluate this concept against

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[185] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review* 53(1) (1959): pp. 69-105.
[186] Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," *American Behavioural Scientist* 35(4-5) (1992): pp. 450-499.
[187] Caroline Thomas, "Global governance, development and human security: exploring the links," *Third World Quarterly* 22(1) (2001): pp. 159-175.
[188] Michael L. Ross, "Does oil hinder democracy?," *World Politics* 53 (2001): pp. 325-361.

the progress of its pS. The CSI presents itself as a composite tool that can be used to do just this: essentially allowing for an enhanced comprehension of the level of (in)security across the OSCE region. The CSI generally resulted in a high ranking of countries comprising the Nordic region; Western, Southwestern, and Central Europe; and Canada. "Flawed democracies" or "hybrid regimes" were largely situated mid-scale, comprising the Baltics, the Visegrád/Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe. Lastly, the lower tier of CSI rankings included varying "authoritarian regimes" of the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.

The CSI tool includes a wide and deep range of dimensions and measures focused on the security of individuals and communities. At the same time, it correlates well with certain existing socio-economic measures—such as the HDI and per capita GDP. The CSI's strong positive correlation with the HDI inferred that more comprehensively secure pS are associated with higher levels of human development. And the CSI-GDP per capita relationship suggests that comprehensively secure pS are also richer and likely more productive and competitive. The analysis, therefore, lends support to H_1 of this Thesis that: "A CSI can be developed to discern the level of comprehensive security in individual OSCE pS by way of utilizing a combination and synthesis of readily available open access data and indices corresponding to the OSCE's three dimensions," and that despite not being identical to the HDI, given the wider components of security the CSI covers, it nevertheless correlates positively and significantly with the HDI and with data on per capita GDP.

H_2: CSI and Examination of the OSCE's Post-Communist States
As might be expected, the OSCE pS with the highest CSI values, corresponding to higher levels of comprehensive security by this Thesis' measure, are those belonging to the Nordic region; Western, Southwestern, and Central Europe; and

Canada. However, an examination of the CSI on a global level can conceal insecurities and challenges that are unique to regions. As such, this Thesis undertook an analysis for the constructed "post-communist space," with a focus on the countries that comprise the post-Soviet expanse and Central Asia. A narrowing of analysis shows that the OSCE's 29 post-communist states are tiered towards the mid to lower sections of the CSI ranking in comparison to the remaining 23 pS of our dataset (see **Table 5**). The majority of the post-communist pS have a medium to low CSI score, while the rest of the states are either ranked medium to high. With the exception of Turkey, the OSCE pS that comprise a low CSI are all post-communist. That said, it is important to keep in mind that there can theoretically be substantial movements with the CSI from year to year, and thus the scores and concomitant rankings are certainly not fixed and can change on an annual basis. The current CSI ranking of the OSCE's post-communist pS groupings can be generally assessed via sub-regions as follows:

- **The Baltic Region** (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), which collectively scores an average CSI score of 7.52.

- **Visegrád/Central Europe** (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary), scoring an average CSI score of 7.22.

- **Southeastern Europe** (Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), scoring an average CSI score of 6.51.

- **Mongolia**, with a CSI score of 6.07.

- **The Caucasus** (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), with a collective average CSI score of 6.02.

- **Eastern Europe** (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine), with an average CSI score of 5.53.

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Table 5: CSI Statistical Matrix for the OSCE's Post-Communist pS

Post-Communist pS	Country Code	Comprehensive Security Index	Politico-Military Dimension	Environmental Dimension	Human Dimension
Estonia	EST	7.68	7.42	8.38	7.23
Czech Republic	CZE	7.58	7.63	7.90	7.21
Lithuania	LTU	7.49	7.38	8.06	7.04
Slovenia	SVN	7.48	7.82	7.23	7.38
Latvia	LVA	7.40	7.27	8.03	6.89
Slovakia	SVK	7.30	7.21	7.74	6.94
Poland	POL	7.06	7.00	7.48	6.69
Hungary	HUN	6.97	6.97	7.52	6.42
Bulgaria	BGR	6.88	6.64	7.57	6.44
Croatia	HRV	6.84	6.82	7.32	6.37
Romania	ROU	6.57	5.80	7.65	6.26
Serbia	SRB	6.42	5.90	6.88	6.47
Georgia	GEO	6.39	6.47	7.05	5.64
Montenegro	MNE	6.32	5.93	7.04	5.97
Albania	ALB	6.28	5.71	6.94	6.20
TFYRO Macedonia	MKD	6.26	5.68	7.44	5.67
Armenia	ARM	6.09	5.26	7.60	5.42
Mongolia	MNG	6.07	5.72	5.96	6.51
Kazakhstan	KAZ	5.87	5.58	7.11	4.92
Moldova	MDA	5.78	4.55	6.73	6.07
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	5.61	4.86	6.17	5.80
Azerbaijan	AZE	5.61	5.03	7.37	4.42
Belarus	BLR	5.59	4.66	7.05	5.07
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	5.40	3.67	6.71	5.81
Russian Federation	RUS	5.30	4.16	7.03	4.72
Ukraine	UKR	5.22	3.40	6.39	5.86
Uzbekistan	UZB	4.92	4.41	5.80	4.55
Tajikistan	TJK	4.87	3.46	6.56	4.58
Turkmenistan	TKM	4.42	3.31	5.88	4.06

- **Russia**, scoring a CSI of 5.30.

- And, finally, **Central Asia** (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan), with an average CSI score of 5.09.

Indeed, the rankings here do not represent the precise ordering of the individual states themselves in the CSI, but rather for the region as a whole. For instance, in this version of the CSI, the Czech Republic in Central Europe independently ranks much higher than the Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia. Kazakhstan too breaks away significantly from its Central Asian grouping and even ranks higher than Russia.

A correlation analysis was also carried out using the CSI scores of post-communist OSCE pS and those of the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI), which altogether revealed a substantially strong relationship. The BTI analyzes and appraises the quality of democracy, market economy, and political management in a range of developing and transition countries, including those comprising the post-communist space.[189] An assessment of the CSI and BTI measures generated a coefficient of $r = 0.96$ ($R^2 = 0.91$), indicating a near perfect uphill or positive linear relationship (see **Figure 8**). Given that the BTI is akin to the CSI, the scatter graph thus plots the Baltic and Visegrád/Central European post-communist pS towards the upper right quadrants. The ensuing trend down the slope then includes a host of Southeastern European states, followed by the countries of the Caucasus, which is sandwiched by Mongolia. Towards the bottom left hand corner are the Eastern European countries, Russia, and then, generally, the Central Asian states. Given the positive association between the CSI and BTI, it can thus be stated that more comprehensively secure pS are also those that tend to be progressing more towards democracy, market economy and, overall, possessing good political management.

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[189] BTI, "BTI 2016 Transformation Index," accessed January 7, 2018, http://bit.ly/2DxzHha.

Figure 8

POST-COMMUNIST CSI AND BERTELSMANN'S TRANSFORMATION INDEX

$y = 3.7595x - 10.078$
$R^2 = 0.9128$

(Scatter plot: x-axis "CSI SCORE" ranging 4.00 to 8.00; y-axis "BTI SCORE (STATUS + MANAGEMENT)" ranging 0.00 to 20.00. Labeled data points: POL, SVK, ROU, HRV, EST, SRB, MNE, CZE, MKD, MDA, BGR, LVA, BIH, AZE, SVN, LTU, UKR, GEO, HUN, ARM, TKM, RUS, KAZ, KGZ, BLR, ALB, TJK, UZB, MNG)

Turning to the CSI and country snapshots, the Czech Republic is the second best performer in the Eastern bloc, with a score of 7.58. The country was, in fact, the first member of the Eastern bloc to be granted status as a "developed economy." While having been affected by the 2008 financial crisis, Czech Republic has stayed afloat largely due to the stable banking system and low public debt. There is satisfaction among Czechs with living conditions, and there has been a lowering of poverty and unemployment. There has also been an immense improvement in the country's business environment, with excellent infrastructure, low-cost electricity, and affordable financial services. In healthcare, the Czech Republic has the highest score among the former Eastern bloc, although it grapples with one of the highest obesity rates in Europe. Of concern, too, is the low tolerance it has for immigrants and ethnic minorities, although, conversely, it has the greatest tolerance for the LGBT community.[190]

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[190] "Survey shows Czechs are the least tolerant in EU toward blacks, Buddhists, Muslims, Roma," *Romea.cz*, last modified October 18, 2015, https://bit.ly/2rcLbxc / Olga Khazan, "The Country That's

Perceived as an "illiberal democracy," Hungary scores the lowest on the CSI in Central Europe (6.97). Although it was the first to apply for EU membership after the downfall of the USSR and made giant strides for some time in all areas of society, poor governance has plagued the country, with the government even going so far as to weaken the powers of the Constitutional Court. The percentage of women holding seats in parliament is also one of the smallest in the world. There has evidently been an increase in poverty among Hungarians, and this together with an increase in nationalist tendencies and populist rhetoric under Prime Minister Victor Orbán has not created conditions favourable to comprehensive security.[191]

Bosnia and Herzegovina tallies the lowest CSI in Southeastern Europe, with a score of 5.61. While the country formally submitted its candidacy for the EU in 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still considered an "illiberal, managed democracy." There is a political crisis, with obstinate tensions stemming from the Republika Srpska, especially with its attempts to hold unconstitutional referendums to challenge Sarajevo's central authority. There are immense voting irregularities, corruption, and weak protection of property rights. Government spending is also high and inefficient. Furthermore, the country's entrepreneurial ecosystem is deemed one of Southeastern Europe's most onerous.[192]

With its vast mineral resources, Kazakhstan (5.87) stands apart from its general grouping of Central Asian states which hold a collective CSI average of 5.09.

Most Accepting of Homosexuality? Spain," *The Atlantic*, last modified June 4, 2013, https://theatln.tc/2HJ6X3k.

[191] Krisztina Than and Marton Dunai, "Hungary, defying EU, limits powers of top court," *Reuters*, last modified March 12, 2013, https://reut.rs/2w0l8Q9 / "Hungary among EU countries with highest poverty rates," *Budapest Business Journal*, last modified April 25, 2018, https://bit.ly/2Krr4Vs / Patrick Kingsley, "As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What's Possible," *New York Times*, last modified February 10, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2KrfOrR.

[192] Jasmin Mujanović, "Republika Srpska's referendum: A prelude to a nationalist landslide in the Bosnian elections," *LSE European Politics and Policy*, https://bit.ly/2dlWDiC / Maja Garaca, "Bosnia and Herzegovina least free country in SEE –study," *SeeNews*, last modified December 18, 2017, https://bit.ly/2FuhZrf /Mladen Lakic, "Entrepreneur Bucks Trend Among Business-Shy Bosnians," *Balkan Insight*, last modified January 2, 2018, https://bit.ly/2CH3WRH.

The petrol-rich Kazakhstan tops higher than the Eastern European pS and even Russia and Azerbaijan. Business savvy has translated wealth into considerable improvements in economic conditions for people, with falling poverty rates, lower unemployment, and a more open economy. There have also been enhancements in logistics and telecommunications infrastructure, which has made for a better business climate. Kazakhstan is ranked relatively high in education, most notably having ensured free and compulsory secondary education and this sector remains an ongoing priority. That said, as with many post-Soviet states, governance remains a struggle, with authoritarian leader Nazarbayev at the helm, there have been a number of cases of opposition suppression and human rights abuses.[193]

Petrol-rich states in general, such as Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan (save Turkmenistan), tend to do better than their respective regional groupings in such rankings. However, the pS need to be especially scrutinized since their hydrocarbon wealth has also translated into a decrease in the human dimension of comprehensive security. In Kazakhstan, for example, there are heavy restrictions on freedom and low press dynamism. Although, there is still high confidence in the government as it is seen as having turned the economy around.[194]

An interesting data "outlier" in the CSI is Turkmenistan. While Turkmenistan is a massive hydrocarbon rich state, it scores 4.42 on the CSI, the lowest ranking

[193] World Bank, "Kazakhstan's Economy is Rising – It is Still All About Oil," last modified December 14, 2017, https://bit.ly/2HDCW8X / Shenel Ozisik, "Education in Kazakhstan," *The Borgen Project*, last modified January 16, 2015, https://bit.ly/2HDv3jT / Zhazira Dyussembekova, "Kazakhstan moves up one spot to 41st on 2018 Index of Economic Freedom," *The Astana Times*, last modified February 9, 2018, https://bit.ly/2vWfpdO / Human Rights Watch, "Kazakhstan: Opposition Activists Arrested," last modified January 14, 2012, https://bit.ly/2jkGGO8.
[194] Maria Zagozina, "The Resource Curse Paradox: natural resources and economic development in the former Soviet countries," (Master's thesis, University of Helsinki, Department of Forest Sciences, 2014) / Catherine Putz, "With Media Law Amendments, Kazakhstan Deals a Blow to Press Freedom," *The Diplomat*, last modified January 3, 2018, https://bit.ly/2HGKSWQ / Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2017: Kazakhstan Profile," https://bit.ly/2I0635T /Nurseit Niyazbekov, "Kazakhstan's government is using social media to tame rebellion," *The Conversation*, last modified March 21, 2017, https://bit.ly/2jkGKgV.

among the 52 pS of our database, with Tajikistan (scoring a CSI of 4.87) being the second lowest. Although enjoying the second highest GDP per capita in Central Asia (after Kazakhstan), Turkmenistan's wealth comes at a price to the human dimension. While both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are authoritative in governance nature, in that they stifle opposition, religious groups, and the media, and possess strong executive power, Turkmenistan's level of closed society and oppression far exceeds that of its neighbours, including Tajikistan. Despite the legacy of the civil war and being the poorest OSCE pS in terms of GDP per capita, Tajikistan has been able to considerably reduce its poverty rate (much of it due to regular remittances sent by large numbers of its population working in Russia), mount its life expectancy, and increase efforts to raise literacy rates. While political trepidation and terrorist casualties are imminent, there are no civil or ethnic war causalities, and battlefield deaths are few in Central Asia. Homicides are also the lowest in the region.[195]

Contrary to the second hypothesis of this Thesis, Mongolia, with a score of 6.07, stands out considerably in the CSI ranking among the OSCE's post-communist pS, performing better than Azerbaijan, the Eastern European states, Russia, and Central Asia. Mongolia scores particularly high in the human dimension relative to a number of Eurasian states. This rank is likely due to the country's worthy performance on education, media sector vibrancy, social capital, and civil society, which has interestingly existed even prior to industrialization. Mongolia has embraced financial sector development and market liberalization, although there are setbacks in its management of public finances and the rule of law. Moreover, although Mongolia's mineral wealth has immense potential, having contributed to an

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[195] Paul Stronski, "Turkmenistan at Twenty-Five: The High Price of Authoritarianism," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, last modified January 30, 2017, http://ceip.org/2kMWZ4L / World Bank, "Tajikistan: Investing in People to Reduce Poverty and Raise Living Standards," last modified April 8, 2013, https://bit.ly/2jjWxMH / World Bank, "Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)," https://bit.ly/2w0r7Ev.

economic boom and a fall in poverty, it does pose an obstacle in the area of environmental performance, from water and forest depletion to pasture degradation. A "resource curse" could also loom large, as it remains to be seen whether the country could shift gears on its democratic institutions given its growing mining revenue.[196]

While each having its own challenges, whether reeling from economic crisis, governance issues, or lack of personal freedoms, the Caucasian states generally do much better than expected in the CSI than Russia and the Eastern European states. There are probably valid reasons for such a scoring. Of particular relevance is Georgia (6.39). In the post-2003 Rose Revolution, Georgian reformer Mikhail Saakashvili left a legacy of reform, leading to advancements in judicial independence and rule of law, which are some of the best scores in the region. Reforms have also extended to infrastructure development and education, with the raising of literacy rates. Moreover, personal freedom has augmented immensely, with homosexuality being legalized and the banning of the death penalty. Georgia's democracy level is also one of the best among post-Soviet states. There has, however, been a recent decline in confidence in electoral integrity and in government, which some attribute to the new presidency of Giorgi Margvelashvili. The country also still faces a protracted conflict with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[197]

As the CSI stipulates contrary to the hypothesis, the Eastern European region scores a lower average on comprehensive security than some of its eastern

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[196] Alicia Campi, Mongolia's Quest to Balance Human Development in its Booming Mineral-Based Economy," *Brookings*, last modified January 10, 2012, https://brook.gs/2HIpJrt / Julian Dierkes, "Mongolia: An unexpected bastion of democracy thanks to its youth," *The Conversation*, last modified July 18, 2017, https://bit.ly/2jji6gz / Tuvshintugs Batdelger, Mongolia's economic prospects and challenges," *East Asia Forum*, last modified March 23, 2014, https://bit.ly/2KpPH4J.

[197] *Economist*, "Georgia, a model of reform, is struggling to stay clean," last modified June 29, 2017, https://econ.st/2JFwgUh / "EU sees continued progress regarding human rights in Georgia," *Agenda.ge*, last modified April 28, 2018, https://bit.ly/2JEMEof /Giorgi Menabde, "Abkhazia and South Ossetia Reject Georgia's Peace Plan," *The Jamestown Foundation*, last modified April 18, 2018, https://bit.ly/2rdmpO5.

neighbours—such as Georgia. First, Moldova, with a score of 5.78, has been held back by economic and educational quality, corruption, and ineffective governance. More pointedly, when it comes to the environment, there is a lack of emission controls and excessive pesticide use.[198] Second, Belarus, at 5.59, continues to be constrained by the government of Lukashenko, imbued with heavy state regulation of the economy, weak infrastructure, low political rights, and poor governance. Consequently, this has meant a dearth in foreign investment.[199] Finally, scoring 5.22, Ukraine has undergone much change and furore over the past few years. From the 2014 revolution to the enduring armed conflict with Russia, the causalities and terror bouts have severely impacted the country. Ukraine's economy has faltered although there are prospects of stabilization. Media conditions are better, with strengthened legislation and relatively less violence committed against media workers. That said, citizens' overall confidence in government, their perceptions of corruption, and judicial independence have all decreased.[200]

Russia too exhibits a poorer performance than expected in the CSI, with a cumulative score of 5.30. Although many conjure images of Russia possessing a strong military, the CSI index denotes a significantly low ranking for Russia in the Politico-Military dimension. This is to suggest that government effectiveness and conflict, likely spewed by the Crimean annexation, deters peace and has led to

[198] Vlad Spânu, "Why is Moldova Poor and Economically Volatile?," *Moldova Foundation*, last modified June 25, 2014, https://bit.ly/2j4PBnz / Denis Cenusa, "Geopolitical Games Expected Ahead Of Moldova's 2018 Elections – Analysis," *Eurasia Review*, last modified October 11, 2017, https://bit.ly/2rcg3PH / NATO, "Destroying dangerous pesticides in Moldova," last modified February 28, 2013, https://bit.ly/2w0moT1.
[199] Henry Foy, "Lukashenko Doubles Down," *The American Interest*, last modified April 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/2ransyT / Anna Romandash, "What's Going On in Belarus?," *Fair Observer*, last modified June 15, 2017, https://bit.ly/2w0kKkl.
[200] Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Failing Its Human Rights Commitments," last modified January 18, 2018, https://bit.ly/2rciVv9 / Orysia Lutsevych, "Ukraine is on the brink of media freedom, but oligarchs are set to put a stop to it," *Independent*, last modified December 2, 2016, https://ind.pn/2rdD8l5 / "Over 68% of Ukrainians don't trust Poroshenko – poll," *Unian*, last modified October 26, 2017,https://bit.ly/2rcFtvB.

tumultuous circumstances in the country. Since 2015, the Russian economy has been contracting as the country falls into a recession due to low oil prices and sanctions. Moreover, civil liberties continue to decline in Putin's Russia, although ironically citizen satisfaction has risen, which may be the product of an effective propaganda campaign.[201]

Accounting for Differences: What's Behind the Low CSIs for Post-Soviet pS?

Taking the results together, it is clear that there are considerable variances in the CSI, or the conditions of comprehensive security, across the OSCE's post-communist pS. Fish et al. explain that after the collapse of communist regimes in wider Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, "the successor states followed a diversity of development paths." As indicated by the CSI ranking, some are now comparatively open and stable polities, as in Poland and Estonia, while others grapple with transitional reforms, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, or have variants of authoritarianism, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.[202]

Zooming in closer, with the exception of the three Baltic pS, the remaining 12 post-Soviet states are ranked having a low CSI score (albeit Georgia scoring higher among the non-Baltic post-Soviet pack). Observing Freedom House measures for a sense of general trends, there does not seem to be a single year when the non-Baltic post-Soviet space on average has relished the ranking level of "political rights" attained during Gorbachev's time. The CSI shows the dismal reality of these post-

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[201] Jennifer Benz et al. "Public Opinion in Russia: Russians' Attitudes on Economic and Domestic Issues," *The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research*, 2014, https://bit.ly/2KtJjt4 / Lucian Kim, "Russia's Troubled Economy Overlooked In 2017," *NPR*, last modified December 24, 2017, https://n.pr/2DiatyU / "Russia Leading 'Assault' on Freedom of Expression — HRW," *The Moscow Times*, last modified July 18, 2017, https://bit.ly/2JDPJou.
[202] M. Steven Fish, "What Has a Quarter Century of Post-Communism Taught Us About the Correlates of Democracy?," in *A Quarter Century of Post-Communism Assessed*, eds. M. Steven Fish, Graeme Gill, and Milenko Petrovic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 11-12.

Soviet states, with many ranking at the lower rungs of the scale.[203]

Apart from the shared communist nature of these regimes under the tutelage of a hegemonic Communist Party organization, "historical and cultural aspects diverge, from religion to economic development to geographical proximity to democracies."[204] Fish explicitly delves into investigating the structural explanations that account for the variation in outcomes for the political regimes. In fact, his analysis of post-communist variance suggests a broad (but non-exhaustive) conjecture based on surprisingly conventional assumptions: "wealthier countries have fared better than poorer ones and less fuel-dependent economies better than more fuel-dependent ones. Those that are closer to the West appear to have done better than those that are farther away. And … Catholic countries have done better than Orthodox countries, which have done better than Muslim countries."[205]

This is surprisingly accurate for the relatively wealthy, less fuel-dependent, Christian Baltic and Visegrád countries, which all feature at the top compared to the other post-communist states. McFaul suggests that this standing has much to do with these countries' early history in transition, when "hegemonic democrats from below," including figureheads, such as Wałęsa, Havel, and Landsbergis, were committed to certain democratic notions and relished significant command over their communist rivals. This was used to instate new democratic regimes and cast aside old leaders in processes of institutional design. Societal mobilization was thus driven by popular forces and was critical to impose their will on weaker communist elites.[206]

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[203] Elen Aghekyan et al., *Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy—Freedom in the World 2017* (Washington D.C.: Freedom House, 2017), http://bit.ly/2kM2aD8.

[204] Fish, "What Has a Quarter Century of Post-Communism Taught Us ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

[205] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[206] Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," in *After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition*, eds. Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 212-244.

While the CSI ranking generally confirms Fish's analysis of the determinants of political regime, it is important to recognize anomalies. For example, resource-poor Belarus and Tajikistan are just as resiliently authoritarian as hydrocarbon-rich Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, thus a pure reliance on the "resource curse" theory may be questionable. Kazakhstan is also a predominantly Muslim country and yet, it does better than the largely Orthodox Christian pS of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. And then there is the case of economic development and its influence in explaining a variation of post-communist outcomes. In certain cases, economic growth in the post-Soviet space has actually translated into the resilience of authoritarianism. On the other hand, some of the region's poorer countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, seem to be among its most "democratic."

It is imperative to recognize certain incongruities with country comparisons, while also acknowledging that factors, such as a weak civil society, choices of economic policies (such as inefficient import substitution strategies), inflation rates, corruption, pre-communist history, the communist legacy, among other determinants, can play a role in influencing post-communist variances. That said, Henry Hale's argument that a set of key structural and non-structural factors are reasons as to why the post-Soviet states, with the exception of the Baltics, have had problematic transitions may explain their low CSI rankings and why certain anomalies exist. Hale argues that all non-Baltic post-Soviet states developed "patronal polities," where the politics of the "equilibrium" have been entrenched with the personal association of leading politicians, rather than formal institutions or ideologies.[207] Since the pre-Soviet days, patronalism was used by the elites to structure political life. This

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[207] Henry E. Hale, *Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

continues to this day in Eurasia and is considered a resource and reality to be exploited, posing a threat to the emergence of liberal democracy, with its civil society, rule of law, and low corruption, which are what the OSCE and other Western institutions wish to foment. This thus separates the region from the Baltics, which all began with low levels of patronalism, fared well in economic reform, and benefited from strong prospects of EU membership in 1991.[208] For the rest of the post-Soviet pS, however, Hale explains there is a tendency for regimes in the region to revert to autocratic, corrupt, personalistic, and patronage-based forms of rule, comprising power struggles in informal or day-to-day extended networks. This has occurred, for example, with Armenia's Levon Ter-Petrossian and Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, who were both initially seen as democrats, but eventually gave in to authoritarian tendencies.[209]

In the context of patronalism, Hale further argues that there are two principal trajectories for the majority of post-Soviet regimes: "political pluralism" and "political closure," which also seem to be represented through the CSI's rankings, with the countries of the latter scoring considerably lower on the CSI. *Political pluralism*, which can be a foundation for periods of open political and even electoral competition, only tends to emerge when networks fail to coordinate their political activities around a single recognized patron, with at least two 'sides' having the support of roughly equal coalitions, which can then create a space for opposition politics.[210] McFaul reiterated this concept, explaining:

> the distribution of power between the old regime and its challengers was relatively equal … Rather than a stalemate, compromise, and pacted transitions to democracy, however, such situations in the post-communist

[208] Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," *Slavic Review* 58(4) (1999): pp. 756-793.
[209] Hale, *Patronal Politics …, op. cit.*
[210] Henry E. Hale, "25 Years after the USSR: What's Gone Wrong?" *Journal of Democracy* 27 (3) (2016): pp. 24-35.

world resulted in protracted confrontation between relatively balanced powers.[211]

This is true of the initial transition cases of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, which, at the beginning, had popular forces drive regime change, like in the Baltics and the Visegrád, but these were eventually "unable to consolidate their power and were displaced or forced to share power." Political pluralism is also evident in Kyrgyzstan, after the 2010 revolution; Georgia, after Saakashvili's leaving; and, Ukraine, when there were roughly equal power networks between Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Tymoshenko vying for influence. Such "stalemates" have led to non-consistent, unpredictable regimes, of varying outcomes. For example, "electoral democracy in Moldova and Mongolia, [and] fragile and partial democracies in Russia and Ukraine."[212]

On the other hand, according to Hale, a *political closure* "occurs when a country's powerful networks successfully coordinate their political activities around a single patron or manage to defeat those who failed to strike a deal with the winning side in time. Even if opposition is not banned, their lives are made difficult, and can serve the patron's interests."[213] This requires careful coordination and refereeing among multiple networks. Political closure is a trend among states led by several post-Soviet leaders, from Putin to Berdymuhamedov. According to Graeme Gill, the legacies of closure and the power of the "old regime forces" can be traced back to the years of *perestroika*, when there was a "suppression of autonomous political forces."[214] Moreover, McFaul points to the paucity of democrats during the transitional moment between the August 1991 coup d'état attempt in Moscow and

[211] McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 212-244.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Hale, "25 Years after the USSR ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 24-35.
[214] Graeme Gill, "Trajectories of Political Development in the Post-Soviet States," in *A Quarter Century of Post-Communism Assessed*, eds. M. Steven Fish, Graeme Gill, and Milenko Petrovic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 85-86.

the USSR's dissolution in December 1991.[215] Political closure has led to two sub-paths in the region: one where the control of a "hegemonic autocrat" has essentially been unchallenged due to weak popular forces from the outset, as in the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the other where significant opposition to patron authority had to be overcome, such as in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Tajikistan.

Hypothesis 2 Conclusions

The CSI ranking of the OSCE's post-communist pS, to a large extent, confirms H_2 and its ranking prediction. Indeed, a narrowing of analysis shows that the OSCE's 29 post-communist states are tiered towards the mid to lower sections of the CSI ranking in comparison to the remaining 23 pS of our database in their CSI scores. With the exception of Turkey, the OSCE pS that comprise a low CSI are all post-communist. The first part of the hypothesis indeed holds true: "From among the post-communist states, CSI scores will be highest among the Baltic states and the Visegrád/Central and Southeastern European states." Beyond this, however, there are some interesting twists, perhaps owing to the Crimean conflict and other sub-regional dynamics. After Southeast Europe, the CSI results have Mongolia taking the lead, followed by the Caucasus doing significantly better than expected. Coming after is the Eastern European grouping and Russia, and then, finally, as projected, the Central Asian states. This general ordering was also confirmed by way of a correlation analysis conducted between the CSI and the BTI scores (see **Figure 8**), illustrating a near perfect positive linear relationship. There are, however, certain anomalies. For example, in the current iteration of the CSI, the Czech Republic in Central Europe individually ranks much higher than the Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia, which

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[215] McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 212-244.

as a collective grouping, however, their average CSI ranks the highest. Kazakhstan too breaks away significantly from its Central Asian grouping and even ranks higher than Russia.

Variances in the post-communist CSI rankings can be attributed to a range of factors, from low civil society to poor economic development to authoritarianism. Fish suggests that the post-communist pS that: are wealthier, have less-fuel dependent economies, are closer to the West, and are Christian, fare better as societies.[216] This surprisingly conventional assumption largely holds true for the relatively wealthy, less fuel-dependent, Christian Baltic and Visegrád countries that feature at the top of the CSI post-communist rankings. Overall, "patronalism," a structural factor introduced by Hale, is evident in the post-Soviet context. This has generally produced a "political closure" rather than "political pluralism," which is exhibited by the low CSI rankings of most post-Soviet pS. The overarching narrative, specifically in the post-Soviet context, seems to point to a privileging of state security over human security, and this is likely due, in part, to the need to grapple with a range of issues, from secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova to the 'Global War on Terror' to the crackdown on ISIS.[217] Border controls, surveillance against potential threats, and crackdowns have all exacerbated the state security's privileged position in the region. Given low levels of CSI scores across all three OSCE dimensions, there thus remains a need for post-Soviet states to consider the possibility of reconceptualizing the state as a human security provider, in recognition that state security can only be realized when individuals are also secured from physical, social and environmental harm.

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[216] Fish, "What Has a Quarter Century of Post-Communism Taught Us ...," *op. cit.*
[217] Acronym for the terror group the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria'.

H₃: OSCE Post-Communist States and Proximity to Europe

The admission of the Baltic and Central European post-communist states into the EU has long been hailed a success, with accession stimulating efforts of democratic socialization and positive institutional changes. As a result of the admission of countries, such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, citizens in the EU's neighbouring countries have effectively been enthused to join the cluster of Western states, with the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions being a testament to pro-West sentiments and the EU's attraction.

Examining this tendency, it is safe to say that, generally, democratization on the whole is traversing from the West to the East. Nevertheless, there are palpable inconsistencies with this supposition. For example, Belarus is deemed the "last dictatorship in Europe,"[218] Moldova experiences banking system fraud and political infighting, and Russia has annexed Crimea and is known to restrict civil liberties and political rights. These countries do not necessarily demonstrate a strong showing for democracy. However, this is not to say that these countries are totally impervious, as exchanges still occur given their geographical proximity to Europe.

While studies commonly focus on path dependent or actor-based approaches to understanding post-communist anomalies, geography or geopolitics, arguably the most obvious of factors, is largely downplayed. While this may be comprehensible considering the growing role of globalized mass communication, McFaul acknowledges that "neighbourhoods" and their proximity to the West "matter," alluding to the importance owed to the territorial aspects of diffusion.[219] In this respect, Tomila Lankina and Lullit Getachew identify that the post-communist area exhibits substantial "geographical clustering of democratic winners and losers … with

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[218] Peter Pomerantsev, "Why Europe's Last Dictatorship Keeps Surprising Everyone," *Washington Post*, last modified March 25, 2017, http://wapo.st/2uaJ0Q1.
[219] McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 212-244.

Central and East European countries in the West [being] better performers than the former USSR states in the east."[220]

Laurence Whitehead precisely discusses the component of "contagion through proximity," which explains that there exists a "contagious" character of democratization due to the interactions of strong democratic nations with their neighbouring countries in many parts of the world.[221] Kubicek, in turn, explains how political developments in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan can be interpreted as having regimes "infected" or "contaminated" with democracy owing to proximity to and interactions with states that have liberal democratic regimes.[222] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way highlight dimensions of "leverages" and "linkages" that contribute to the effectiveness of a contagion: "economic, geopolitical, social and communication linkages, and transnational civil society." Leverages can include diplomatic pressure and political intervention, while linkages entail the reshaping of domestic power and resources.[223] One key leverage tool, Petrovic explains, is EU conditionality and its accession negotiation process, known to have enticed Baltic, Visegrád and some Southeastern European post-communist states to undergo democratic reforms and socialization for EU access. As such, these linkages were eventually able to successfully increase the "cost" of authoritarianism.[224]

Today, the EU is one of the key Western players operating in Eurasia. A number of studies already affirm the impact the EU has had on altering government

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[220] Tomila V. Lankina and Lullit Getachew, "A geographic incremental theory of democratization: territory, aid, and democracy in postcommunist regions," *World Politics* 58(4) (2006): pp. 536-582.

[221] Laurence Whitehead, "Three International Dimensions of Democratization," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 15.

[222] Paul Kubicek, "The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38 (2) (2005): p. 271.

[223] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3) (2005): pp. 21-25.

[224] Milenko Petrovic, "Post-Communist Transition: Under the Umbrella of Uneven EUropeanisation: East Central Europe, the Baltic States and the Balkans," in *A Quarter Century of Post-Communism Assessed*, eds. M. Steven Fish, Graeme Gill, and Milenko Petrovic (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 41.

policies and institutional frameworks, possessing an ability to potentially undermine patronalism. This Thesis specifically tests whether there is a correlation between the CSI scores and the geographic distance from the capital city of each of the 29 post-communist OSCE pS to Vienna, a key focal point in Europe and the location of the OSCE Secretariat. A correlation analysis ended up producing a coefficient of $r = -0.59$ ($R^2 = 0.35$), inferring a moderate downhill or negative relationship, in other words, suggesting that there is a moderate relationship between an OSCE post-communist state being closer to Europe's frontier and having a higher CSI at the same time (see **Figure 9**). The further away one gets from Vienna, it is clear that the "geographic contagion" (of EU democratic values) is weaker and cannot, for example, be easily applied to Central Asia. This is also in line with Fish's general conjecture that "countries that are closer to the 'good neighborhood' of Western Europe do better than those in the less-good neighbourhood of Inner Asia, abutting the Middle East and

Figure 9: CSI of OSCE Post-Communist pS and Proximity to Vienna

China."[225] This further suggests that the geographic proximity to the EU "facilitates the diffusion of Western influences," having the potential of encouraging greater openness and democratization efforts, thereby increasing comprehensive security. Given the "diffusion potential" of the EU, one can argue that it becomes more apparent why the Kremlin may be actively thwarting democratization in the geographic peripheries of Russia, especially in Ukraine.

Transcending geography, however, it may be argued that globalized linkages and leverages may also contribute to change in pS that are farther away but may be engaging in democratic experiments. However, EU aid disbursements do not seem to move out of line from the geographic contagion hypothesis. While the EU can, of course, distribute a higher amount of aid to post-communist states beyond its immediate neighbourhood, that does appear to be the case. Thus, it seems to be sticking to the geographic typology of contagion. As such, one finds that the Central Asian post-Soviet states receive some of the least, or if not the least, amount of EU official development assistance in the post-Soviet space. This illustrates that the EU is just as "geopolitical" with its aid to post-communist states as Russia, shaping its contagion through funding and assistance in certain neighbouring states. In 2015, for example, Kazakhstan received US$45m, Kyrgyzstan US$80m, Uzbekistan US$37m, Tajikistan US$84m and Turkmenistan US$7m in EU aid, whereas those non-EU post-communist states that were closer to Europe received significantly more funding. Ukraine in 2015 received the greatest amount at US$834m, Serbia received US$619m, Bosnia and Herzegovina with US$335m, Albania at US$247m, and Georgia US$238m, among others.[226]

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[225] Fish, "What Has a Quarter Century of Post-Communism Taught Us ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.
[226] EU, "Development Atlas—EU Aid Explorer," *European Commission*, accessed October 18, 2017, http://bit.ly/2u4odxA.

These significantly higher numbers reveal a relationship with those post-communist frontier countries that possess more strategic connections with the EU, falling within the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, either being EU Eastern Partnership states, EU candidates, potential candidates, or states that signed an EU Association Agreement. Belarus and Russia, however, are exceptions, with Russia receiving no official development assistance in 2015 (likely in reaction to Russia's annexation of Crimea), and Belarus receiving below the minimum US$100m of EU aid—the two countries are also doing poorly in their comparative CSI scores. In the correlation analysis, Mongolia stands out, but for different reasons. Despite being the farthest OSCE post-communist pS from Vienna and also receiving a relatively small amount of aid from the EU (US$50m in 2015), the country has a considerably high CSI. Mongolia has been able to democratize its society and open its economy without relying too heavily on the EU.

Hypothesis 3 Conclusions

Based on the data analysis presented, it is fair to posit that H_3 can be accepted, or, more accurately, its null hypothesis can be rejected. In assessing post-communist states as a whole, as per the hypothesis, "location or geopolitics plays a role on a country's comprehensive security. In general, though not in all circumstances, scores on the CSI will be lower the farther east of Vienna an OSCE pS is situated. As such, there exists a moderately significant and negative correlation with the CSI scores and capital city distances from Vienna." Correlation analysis does not disprove the hypothesis, illustrating the importance of Whitehead's "geographic contagion" for CSI scores in the OSCE post-communist area, with those pS generally in closer proximity to the EU faring better on the scale. This confirms Fish's observation that the post-communist "countries that are closer to the 'good neighborhood' of Western

Europe do better than those in the less-good neighbourhood of Inner Asia, abutting the Middle East and China."

That said, there are indeed discrepancies with this supposition, particularly represented by Belarus, Moldova and Russia. And while the EU also has the capability of disbursing a greater amount of aid to post-communist states beyond its immediate neighbourhood as a means of "leverage" and "linkage," the analysis shows it ostensibly does not, adhering to the geographic typology of contagion. As such, the Central Asian post-Soviet pS receive some of the least, if not the least, amount of EU official development assistance in the post-Soviet space at large, while Mongolia, again, being an interesting anomaly, holds a relatively high CSI score although it is the farthest away from Europe and receives a meagre amount of EU aid.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS

As Lord Kelvin suggested and history has writ large demonstrated, quantitative metrics are tools for improving performance, including in the field of global security and governance. Representing the shift from the Cold War to post, the world presently faces a wide variety of intricate, transnational challenges that prompt the need to holistically measure the security of states as well as their populations.

This Thesis primarily sought to construct and validate a prototype security and vulnerability assessment tool, the "Comprehensive Security Index" (CSI), a composite measure using open access data capable of appraising and comparing OSCE pS by quantitatively fleshing out the OSCE's three security dimensions through structural factors that provide a sense of a pS' propensity towards turbulence or conflict. A second aim flowing from the first was to study the results of the CSI by elucidating security variances on communities in the OSCE region, particularly in the OSCE's Eurasian post-communist space.

While the CSI resembles a new and unique index unidentical to the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), given the wider components of security the CSI covers, it nevertheless correlates positively and significantly with the HDI and also with data on per capita GDP of States. The CSI generally resulted in a high ranking of countries comprising the Nordic region; Western, Southwestern, and Central Europe; and Canada. The Nordic pS fare well across all three of the OSCE's security dimensions, possessing a robust education system, private sector growth, strong rule of law, as well as a growing concern for the environment. That said, in the politico-

military dimension some of the pS scores have been relatively low, possibly due to an increase in the exports of air defence systems and advanced weaponry of war.

"Flawed democracies" and "hybrid regimes" are largely situated mid-scale on the CSI, comprising pS from the Baltics, the Visegrád/Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe. It is noteworthy that the U.S., as well as five Western European pS (France, Malta, Italy, Cyprus, and Greece) have a medium CSI score. While by and large sticking to democratic ideals and having done relatively well in ensuring a healthy business environment, these countries either struggle with issues, such as populism, healthcare, and gun violence (U.S.); a constant change in government and corruption (Italy); and high unemployment and low tolerance towards immigrants (Cyprus).

The lower tier of CSI rankings includes varying "authoritarian regimes" of the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. Here we find countries such as Azerbaijan, which, while doing strongly in terms of prosperity, as well as environment (given efforts to reduce gas emissions, increase tree cover and protect natural reserves), its income disparity is high, corruption is rampant and there has been government repression of protests. There is also the issue of the frozen but tense conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Central Asian states fare the lowest on the CSI, and across all dimensions. Turkmenistan, with the lowest CSI score among the 52 (out of 57) OSCE pS for which data were available, possesses a vast amount of natural hydrocarbon reserves, but the wealth from this resource has not spread equitably in the country. The government has also been known to permeate all aspects of society, including monitoring citizens, and restricting freedom of movement and religion. Elections are known not to be free and fair, and controls are imposed on the media, judicial system,

and foreign investment.

The CSI's strong positive correlation with the HDI inferred that more comprehensively secure pS are generally associated with higher levels of human development. This confirmed the conjecture of Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy who argued that human development and human security are intertwined.[227] The CSI's negative relationship with the Gini Coefficient signified that the higher a pS ranks on the CSI, the lower its inequality, which is in line with studies that demonstrate that when there is greater or an increase in the level of income inequality, there is less of an increase in productivity and income that could reduce poverty. Finally, the CSI-GDP relationship suggests that comprehensively secure pS are also generally richer, more productive and competitive. This is consistent with the notion argued by Lipset that greater wealth and economic development can create more propitious conditions for open politics.

It is germane to note here as well that relatively prosperous pS, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, fare low on the CSI and are not necessarily prone to democratic conditions; scoring low in the human dimension. Heavily hydrocarbon-dependent countries, in particular, can yield the "corruption effect" posing a challenge to democratization. This is not true, however, for countries like Norway, which, although possesses massive hydrocarbon reserves, has had experience with stable, open politics and democratic institutions long before its gas and oil discovery.

The CSI can provide a more holistic snapshot of security in study areas of the OSCE, and can be adapted to the sub-regional level, as evidenced with the example of the OSCE's Eurasian post-communist pS. The CSI exhibits a near perfect relationship with the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI), endorsing the general

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[227] Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, "Human Security and Human Development ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 98-122.

ordering and trends specifically among the post-communist OSCE pS. This suggests that more comprehensively secure post-communist pS are also those that tend to be progressing more towards democracy, market economy, and overall possess good political management.

Variances in post-communist CSI rankings can be attributed to a range of factors, from weak civil society to poor economic development to authoritarianism. Fish et al. specifically suggest that post-communist pS that: are wealthier, have less-fuel dependent economies, closer to the West, and Christian, fare better as societies. This surprisingly conventional assumption largely holds true for the relatively wealthy, less fuel-dependent, Christian Baltic and Visegrád countries that feature at the top of the CSI post-communist rankings. According to McFaul, their histories with "hegemonic democrats from below" also plays much of a role in differentiating with the histories of other post-Soviet pS.[228]

In general, "patronalism," a structural factor introduced by Hale, is evident in the post-Soviet context, as well as heavily presidentialist constitutional arrangements and a cult of personality. This has altogether led to "political closure" than "political pluralism,"[229] which is exhibited by the low CSI rankings of post-Soviet pS. The overarching narrative explicitly in the post-Soviet context thus seems to point to a privileging of state security over human security and this is likely due, in part, to the need to grapple with a range of issues, from secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova to the 'Global War on Terror' to the crack down on ISIS. Border controls, surveillance against potential threats, crackdowns, etc. have all exacerbated the state's privileged security position. Given low levels of CSI scores in all three OSCE dimensions, there is thus a need for post-Soviet states to consider the

[228] McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 212-244.
[229] Hale, *Patronal Politics ...*, *op. cit.*

possibility of reconceptualizing the state as a human security provider, in recognition that state security can only be realized when individuals are also secured from physical, social and environmental harm.

This study also confirmed Fish's observation that the post-communist "countries that are closer to the 'good neighborhood' of Western Europe do better than those in the less-good neighbourhood of Inner Asia, abutting the Middle East and China."[230] There are, however, discrepancies with this general supposition, particularly represented by Belarus, Moldova and Russia. While the EU has the capability of disbursing a greater amount of aid to post-communist states beyond its immediate neighbourhood as a means of "leverage" and "linkage," the analysis finds that the EU ostensibly does not do so, thus adhering to the geographic typology of contagion. As such, the Central Asian post-Soviet pS receive some of the least, or if not the least, amount of EU official development assistance in the post-Soviet space, while Mongolia again represents an interesting anomaly, as the country possesses a relatively high CSI score despite being the farthest away from Europe and receiving a meagre amount of EU aid.

The overall results of this Thesis show that an architecture can be developed to quantify the OSCE's comprehensive security concept, using the underpinnings of "human security," "systemic security," and the "sectoral approach," which can assist in our understanding of patterns and trends of human security and insecurity across the OSCE area. The end of the Cold War, the internalization of the norms of human and systemic security, together with the rise in global indices and benchmarks, presents an opportunity for the OSCE to actively pursue and implement a benchmark of its own that can operationalize the organization's three comprehensive security

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[230] Fish, "What Has a Quarter Century of Post-Communism Taught Us ...," *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

dimensions. The CSI can be valuable in helping to increase the OSCE's credibility by augmenting transparency and accountability among pS and the organization as a whole, supporting the upholding of the ideals of the Helsinki Accords. It can also serve as a useful instrument for early warning efforts that can allow for forecasts, the adjustment of programs, and more effective policymaking and decisions on security investments and preventive action.

Richard Thaler, 2017 Nobel Economics laureate, maintains that "choice architects," such as employers and legislators, should create policies and tools on a macroeconomic level that "nudge" people towards better decisions.[231] As a "choice architect" itself, the OSCE, with the right policies and tools, has the ability to "nudge" its pS, altering their behaviour for the better, and this position can unquestionably be enhanced by embracing metrics for progress on comprehensive security, such as that offered here by the 'Comprehensive Security Index'.

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[231] Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, and John P. Balz, "Choice Architecture," in *The Behavioural Foundations of Public Policy*, ed. Eldar Shafir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

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APPENDIX A

CSI Heat Map of OSCE pS

Legend

- High CSI
- Medium CSI
- Low CSI

APPENDIX B

OSCE "Comprehensive Security" Dimensions and Excerpt of Activities[232]

Dimension	Main Components and Excerpt of Activities
Politico-Military	• **Arms control:** strengthening small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition stockpile management, including destruction, supporting national small arms control mechanisms, and assisting with the rehabilitation of areas contaminated with explosives. • **Border management:** maintaining a presence in border zones, supporting co-operation and rapid information sharing between border police and neighbouring country counterparts, and training for navy and border security officers. • **Conflict prevention and resolution:** capacity building for local actors aimed at reducing potential drivers and sources of conflict; assisting with dialogue facilitation, mediation and confidence building activities between conflict-affected societies and communities; and monitoring the security situation in OSCE pS. • **Countering terrorism:** promoting the implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and enhancing international legal co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism, countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, and promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures. • **Policing:** building capacities of the law enforcement to address transnational threats; organizing leadership and management training for law enforcement and government officials, judges and prosecutors; developing community policing initiatives and police-public partnership; and advising on legislation reform and institution-building. • **Reform and co-operation in the security sector:** rules of engagement and integrity within defence and security institutions, strengthening the oversight role of parliament, encouraging active participation of civil society, and reviewing draft legislation.
Economic and Environmental	• **Economic activities:** anti-corruption; transport, trade and border crossing facilitation; improving conditions for investment and economic development; sustainable development and good governance; stimulating rural economies; and effective labour migration governance. • **Environmental activities:** promoting transboundary co-operation on environmental challenges; supporting national authorities in the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements; and

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[232] OSCE. "What We Do." Accessed September 15, 2017. http://bit.ly/2HKZ8cT.

	strengthening local, national, and regional capacities for addressing environmental challenges that might have an impact on security. • **Good governance:** strengthening multi-stakeholder co-operation among governments, private sector and civil society; promoting integrity in public service through development and implementation of codes of ethics and asset declaration mechanisms; and supporting regulatory reform and simplification.
Human	• **Roma and Sinti:** projects to help protect the rights of Roma and Sinti; assisting in integration, empowerment and civic participation of Roma and Sinti; and improving housing situations of Roma and Sinti. • **Elections:** advising election commissions; supporting reforms of electoral codes, consulting among stakeholders of the voting process, observing elections, and establishing voter lists. • **Tolerance and non-discrimination:** working with religious leaders, young people and school officials to promote tolerance, inter-faith dialogue and acceptance of diversity; advising institutions to improve and implement anti-discrimination policies; and assisting in the development of legislation and policies, research activities and public outreach. • **Media freedom and development:** monitoring freedom of the media; monitoring and reviewing the improvement and implementation of media legislation; and fostering transparency, credibility and independence of media. • **National minority issues:** working to better integrate national and ethnic minorities into public life, ensuring the protection of ethnic minorities and their rights, and enhancing equitable representation. • **Rule of law:** supporting legislative and judicial reform, strengthening the independence of the judiciary, strengthening public administration, reviewing and helping implement human rights legislation, and contributing to the development of national legal aid systems. • **Human rights:** providing technical support to human rights bodies, reviewing legislation to ensure compliance with OSCE commitments and international human rights standards, and sharing best practices and supporting efforts to ensure international human rights.

Background Information Excerpts on CSI Component Indices

Component and Source	Background	Sample Indicators and Corresponding Sources
POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION		
Government Effectiveness (*World Governance Indicators, World Bank*)[233]	The World Governance Indicators project covers over 200 countries and territories, measuring six composite indicators of governance starting in 1996. One of the six dimensions is "Government Effectiveness." The aggregate indicators are based on several hundred individual underlying variables taken from thirty-one varied data sources. The data reflects the views on governance of survey respondents and public, private, and NGO sector experts worldwide. "Government Effectiveness," in particular, captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, as well as the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.	• Quality of bureaucracy/institutional effectiveness, and excessive bureaucracy/red tape (*The Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire and Democracy Index*) • Infrastructure, and quality of primary education (*World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report*) • Satisfaction with public transportation system, roads and highways, and education system (*Gallup World Poll*) • Coverage areas: public school, basic health services, drinking water and sanitation, electricity grid, transport infrastructure, and maintenance and waste disposal (*Institutional Profiles Database*) • Bureaucratic quality (*Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide*) • Infrastructure disruption, state failure, and policy instability (*Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators*) • Etc.
Global Peace Index (*Institute for Economics and Peace*)[234]	Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the "Global Peace Index" ranks one hundred sixty-three independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness using twenty-three qualitative and quantitative indicators using three thematic domains. The Index is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness and presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. Peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of the harmony achieved by the absence	• Number and duration of internal conflicts; number of deaths from external organized conflict; and number, duration an role in external conflicts (*Uppsala Conflict Data Program*) • Number of deaths from internal organized conflict (*International Institute for Strategic Studies*) • Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population (*Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees*) • Political terror scale (*Amnesty International*) • Impact of terrorism (*Global Terrorism Index*) • Number of homicides per 100,000 people (*UN Office on Drugs and*

[233] World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," last modified September 29, 2017, http://bit.ly/2eKoACq.

[234] Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index 2017: Measuring Peace in a Complex World.* (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017), http://bit.ly/2ud8vfq.

	of violence or the fear of violence, which has been described as Negative Peace. Negative Peace is a compliment to Positive Peace which is defined as the attitudes, institutions, and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies. The main domains of the "Global Peace Index" include: 1) Societal Safety and Security 2) Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict 3) Militarism	*Crime*) • Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people, and nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities (*The Military Balance*) • Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) and supplier (exports) per 100,000 people (*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*)
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION		
Economic Freedom Index (***The Heritage Foundation***)[235]	The Heritage Foundation's "Economic Freedom Index" measures economic freedom based on twelve quantitative and qualitative factors. Economic freedom is the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and property. In an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please. In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital, and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. The four broad categories, or pillars, of the "Economic Freedom" include: 1) Rule of Law 2) Government size 3) Regulatory Efficiency 4) Open Markets For the 2017 Index, most of the data covers the second half of 2015 and the first half of 2016.	• Government integrity: public trust in politicians, irregular payments and bribes, transparency of government policymaking, absence of corruption, perceptions of corruption, and governmental and civil service transparency (*World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness Report; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index;* and *TRACE International, The Trace Matrix*) • Judicial effectiveness: judicial independence, quality of the judicial process, and likelihood of obtaining favourable judiciable decisions (*World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness Report;* and *World Bank, Doing Business*) • Business freedom: starting a business and obtaining a license (procedures, time, cost, minimum capital), etc. (*World Bank, Doing Business; The Economist Intelligence Unit; U.S. Department of Commerce*) • Etc.
Environmental Performance Index (***Yale University***)[236]	The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranks countries' performance on high-priority environmental issues in two areas: protection of human health and protection of ecosystems. The Index is constructed through the calculation and aggregation of more than twenty indicators reflecting national-level	• Environmental risk exposure • Unsafe sanitation • Drinking water quality • Species protection • Fish stocks • Access to electricity • Trend in carbon intensity • Etc.

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[235] Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim, *2017 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017), http://bit.ly/2ppcC7A.

[236] Angel Hsu et al., *2016 Environmental Performance Index* (New Haven: Yale University, 2016).

	environmental data. These indicators are combined into nine issue categories (including Agriculture, Air Quality, Biodiversity and Habitat, Climate and Energy, Forests, Fisheries, Health Impacts, Water Resources, and Water and Sanitation), each of which fit under one of the two overarching objectives. Scores for "Environmental Performance" range from 0 to 100, with 100 being a high environmental performer. The EPI uses primary and secondary data from multilateral organizations, government agencies, and academic collaborations. Primary data is comprised of information gathered directly by human or technological monitoring, including satellite-derived estimates of forest cover and air quality. Secondary data includes national-level statistics subject to the reporting and quality requirements established by data collection entities, such as the International Energy Agency (IEA).	

HUMAN DIMENSION		
Global Gender Gap Index (*World Economic Forum*)[237]	Through the "Global Gender Gap Report," the World Economic Forum quantifies the magnitude of gender disparities and tracks their progress over time, with a specific focus on the relative gaps between women and men across four key areas: health, education, economy and politics. The Report covers one hundred forty-four countries. There are four sub-indexes that comprise the "Global Gender Gap Index": 1) Economic participation and opportunity 2) Educational attainment 3) Health and survival 4) Political empowerment	• Ratios: female labour force participation over male value; female legislators, senior officials and managers over male value; and female professional and technical workers over male value (*ILO 2015*) • Wage equality between women and men for similar work, and ratio: female estimated earned income over male value (*World Economic Forum, 2007/2008, 2015-16*) • Ratio: female literacy over male value (*UNESCO, 2015; UNDP, 2009*) • Ratios: female net primary/secondary/gross tertiary enrollment rate over male value (*UNESCO 2015*) • Sex ratio at birth (Central Intelligence Agency, *2016*) • Ratio: female healthy life expectancy over male value (*World Health Organization, 2013*) • Ratios: females with seats in parliament over male value, and females at ministerial level over male value (*Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015*) • Ratio: number of years with a female head of state (last 50 years) over male value (*World Economic Forum, 2016*)
Tolerance and Inclusion (*Social Progress Index*)[238]	The "Social Progress Index" is an aggregate index of social and environmental indicators that go "beyond GDP" and capture three dimensions of social progress: Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Wellbeing, and Opportunity. The 2017 Social Progress Index includes data from one hundred twenty-eight countries on fifty indicators The Index's "Tolerance and Inclusion" component fits under the "Opportunity" dimension, which measures the degree to which a country's citizens have personal rights and freedoms and are able to make their own personal decisions, as well as whether prejudices or hostilities within a society prohibit individuals from reaching their potential. Scores for "Tolerance and Inclusion" range from 0 to 100,	• Tolerance for immigrants, tolerance for homosexuals, and community safety net (*Gallup World Poll*) • Discrimination and violence against minorities (*Fund for Peace Fragile States Index*) • Religious tolerance (*Pew Research Center Social Hostilities Index*)

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[237] World Economic Forum, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2016* (Cologny/Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016), http://bit.ly/2eKoACq.

[238] Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern, *Social Progress Index 2017* (Washington: Social Progress Imperative, 2017), http://bit.ly/2sf3aSz.

	with 100 being the most tolerant and inclusive; contributing to a higher social progress. The use of data in the current version of the Index is limited to 2006-2016 data for any given indicator and country. This is done to create the most current index possible, while not excluding indicators or countries that update on a less frequent basis.	
Democracy Index (*The Economist Intelligence Unit*)[239]	The Economist Intelligence Unit's "Democracy Index" ranks one hundred sixty-seven countries scored on a scale of 0 to 10 based on sixty indicators. There is no consensus on how to measure democracy. Definitions of democracy are contested, and there is a lively debate on the subject. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalize, and thereby, ultimately, protect freedom. Most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed; the existence of free and fair elections; the protection of minority rights; and respect for basic human rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism. The "Democracy Index" is based on five categories: 1) Electoral process and pluralism 2) Civil liberties 3) The functioning of government 4) Political participation 5) Political culture The Index makes use of expert assessments as well as public-opinion surveys, when available, mainly the World Values Survey. Other sources leveraged include: Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Asian Barometer, and national surveys. Countries are scored from 1 to 10, with 0-4 representing an "authoritarian regime," 4-6 a "hybrid regime," 6-8 a "flawed democracy," and 8-10 a "full democracy."	• Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free/fair? • Are municipal elections both free and fair? • Is there universal suffrage for all adults (bar generally accepted exclusions)? • Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies? • Is potential access to public office open to all citizens? • Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services. • Foreign powers and organizations do not determine important government functions or policies. • Does the government's authority extent over the full territory of the country? • Public confidence in government/political parties. • Is the civil service willing to and capable of implementing government policy? • Voter participation/turn-out for national elections • Women in parliament • Citizens' engagement with politics • The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation. • Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy? • Perception of democracy and public order • There is a strong tradition of the separation of Church and State • Is there free electronic/print media? • Is media coverage robust? • The use of torture by the state. • Do citizens enjoy basic security? • Popular perceptions on protection of human rights • Etc.

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[239]*Economist*, "Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the 'Deplorables'," (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). http://bit.ly/2DV7Yr4.

Press Freedom Index (*Reporters Without Borders*)[240]	Published every year since 2002 by Reporters Without Borders, the "World Press Freedom Index" ranks one hundred eighty countries according to the level of freedom available to journalists. It is a snapshot of the media freedom situation based on an evaluation of pluralism, independence of the media, quality of legislative framework and safety of journalists in each country. It does not rank public policies even if governments obviously have a major impact on their country's ranking. Nor is it an indicator of the quality of journalism in each country. The degree of freedom available to journalists in one hundred eighty countries is determined by pooling the responses of experts to a questionnaire (comprised of eighty-seven questions) devised by Reporters Without Borders. This qualitative analysis is combined with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the period evaluated. The criteria evaluated in the questionnaire are: 1) Pluralism 2) Media independence 3) Media environment and self-censorship 4) Legislative framework 5) Transparency 6) The quality of the infrastructure that supports the production of news and information. This information is complemented by a seventh indicator, "Abuses," which notes abuses and acts of violence against journalists and the media during the evaluation period. Countries have been given scores ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 being the best possible score and 100 the worst.	• Existence of privately owned print press, TV networks, and radio stations • Political and/or religious factors preventing the creation of independent, privately owned media • Difficult of launching an independent private media company • Transparency of granting TV and radio licenses • Ease for authorities to force firing of public radio or TV journalist/executive or private media executive • Private media adjusting content for state subsidies • Officials favouring certain media due to favourable editorial policy or financial ties • Prohibition or discouragement of journalism based on nationality, ethnicity, social class, religion, and/or gender • Media reflecting the range of opinions among members of the public • Government monitoring or threatening journalists • Journalists and practice of self-censorship • Concentration of media power • Existence of a legal mechanism to protect confidentiality of journalists' sources • Laws that include opinion crimes such as blasphemy or disrespect for authority • Extent authorities filter news content on the Internet

[240] Reporters Without Borders, *2016 World Press Freedom Index* (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2016), http://bit.ly/21sxeXd.